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Contents

Editorial Notes 342
Leading Editorials
- The New German Attitude 345
- Disposing of Turkey 347
- Food and the Future 348
- Socialist Sectarianism 350

General Articles
- Wanted—a Policy ..... William Hard 352
- The Embargo ..... Charles Merz 354
- Jane Austen ..... Q. K. 356
- The Future of Pacifism ..... John Dewey 358
- Trivia ..... L. Pearsall Smith 360

Correspondence 360
At the Capitol ..... C. M. 362
Reviews of Books
- Nietzsche's Religion ..... H. J. L. 363
- Swinburne ..... B. H. 364
- Frustrated Nationalities ..... A. J. 366
- Upper Layers 367

ACCORDING to all present appearances one of the most serious possible disasters has overtaken the cause of the western Allies. Hereafter Russia will scarcely count in a military sense as an enemy of Germany. Her army is fading away. Her government has little authority. For the time being her condition is almost one of social dissolution. Even in the midst of disorganization and collapse no Russian government is likely to make a separate peace with Germany, but although she will not make peace she will not and cannot make war. Admitting that Kerensky may be able to keep alive some kind of revolutionary government, Russian economic, political and moral disorganization runs too deep to permit the keeping of properly officered, supplied and munitioned troops in the field. Hereafter the German army will be able to occupy any part of Russia whose seizure will be of economic and military advantage to the German government. It can almost certainly obtain in Russia as much food as is necessary to place the civilian population of the Central Empires on a much more abundant ration. It can concentrate practically all its fresh supplies of soldiers and munitions in the west, and in the fighting in France it can meet its western enemies on practically equal terms.

SERIOUS as are the military consequences of the Russian débacle, the political consequences are even more serious. If the Russian Republic could have been kept together as a coherent and effective negotiating and fighting organization, its influence on the internal and external policies of its Allies would have become increasingly powerful. It could have persuaded or forced its associates to cut out of their program every demand which was in any way tainted with imperialism and its example would have encouraged radicals in every country to insist on social reconstruction. Its collapse will, consequently, increase the strength of reactionary parties and policies all over the world. No doubt the Russian Revolution remains, in spite of military and political disintegration, a formidable moral force which will continue to act insidiously both on its enemies and on its friends. It still remains the biggest net gain made during the war. But before it can bring to the people either of Russia or of Russia's enemies and Allies its proper benefits in the way of economic and political liberation, it will have to pass through a more or less prolonged period of conflict, disorder and apparent futility. We had hoped that this period of disorder, of alternating anarchy and despotism, might have been avoided, but apparently it has come. The anarchy is already breeding the despotism, and despotism will have to stamp out the anarchy at the usual sacrifice of human life and purpose. The clock has been set back, and the loss will only be recovered at a heavy price.

ON no country will the practical consequence of the Russian collapse fall more heavily than on the United States. France and Great Britain are already exerting their full military and economic power. The United States is not, and it must do what it can, not to supply the place of

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Russia, for that is impossible, but to furnish some compensation for the loss. It must prepare to train more soldiers, to furnish more material and munitions, to lend more money to its associates, and to make these additional sacrifices without hesitation or flinching. The war has now become incontestably one of physical and moral attrition. No victory is possible for either of the groups of belligerents except as a consequence of the physical or moral exhaustion of their adversaries. The government of the United States will need to demand of its citizens prodigious sacrifice and exertions and a grim determination not to yield merely for the sake of avoiding the expense of continuing to fight; but the people of the country will be entitled to ask in return for their stupendous sacrifices one definite assurance. They must be protected against any prolongation of the war for purposes which do not command their approval, and the one way in which such protection can be obtained is by means of a much more specific and unambiguous definition of Allied war purposes than any which has yet been attempted. They will expect such a definition to be made in a few weeks, and under the changed conditions the government can hardly refuse to gratify such a reasonable expectation. It has the more reason to do so because only in this way can the American democracy come to the aid of its younger Russian sister. The best assistance this country can render to the Russian Republic is to back up its demand for an unequivocally liberal peace.

EVEN the partisans of General Goethals and those of Mr. Denman must admit the wisdom of President Wilson's action in eliminating both. Each had fallen somewhat short of the requirements of maximum serviceability in a time of national crisis, and the consequence of this defect is a loss to the country of some hundreds of thousands of tons of shipping of which we stand in desperate need. Mr. Denman was chiefly responsible for the appointment of General Goethals. He was in a position to inform himself of the General's habit of mind, his personal capacities and limitations, and should have laid his plans to utilize to the utmost General Goethals's great prestige and force of character. General Goethals should have been able to recognize that a tremendous civil undertaking involving all manner of unknown factors could not be carried on under the principles of strict devolution of authority appropriate to the ordering of a military campaign. But early in the period of their association each fell into the obsession that the other's influence was the chief obstacle to the conduct of the common enterprise. Hence they permitted purely technical matters, like the materials of construction, the form of contract, or the price of supplies to become points of personal strategy. All this was natural enough, but it was intolerable in such a time as the present. It is safe to predict that under the new order of things personal disagreements will be suppressed and technical matters will be settled on their merits. The new chairman of the Shipping Board and the new head of the Emergency Fleet Corporation are both men in whom the country will have confidence.

LAST week the State Department announced its decision not to be represented in the conference of the Allies which is now being held in Paris, for the purpose of discussing the situation in the Balkans. This announcement was intensely disappointing to all Americans who want their country to count effectively not only in economic, naval and military operations of the war, but in its diplomatic and political management. Undoubtedly there will be many subjects discussed at the conference in which this country has only a remote interest; and an American representative to such a conference might have been carefully instructed as to the limits within which he might take part in the deliberations. But the flat refusal of any participation at all is merely a policy of American diplomatic nihilism.

ESSENTIALLY the American nation is vitally interested in a conference of its allies about the Balkans. The war into which the United States has been sucked began in a Balkan controversy. No stable peace is possible unless the extremely difficult problems connected with the political future of that region are wisely handled, and while President Wilson has never indicated how in detail they should be handled, he has proclaimed principles which have an obvious application to the Balkan situation. It is inconceivable for this country to play no part in the deliberations of its Allies about the future organization of a South Slav state, and the adjustment of the conflicting claims of Greece and Italy in the Adriatic, Albania, Epirus and the Aegean. These are among the thorniest political problems of modern statesmanship, and any decision reached in respect to them may affect vitally the duration of the war. It may cost the American nation many thousand lives and many billion dollars. The refusal to participate in so important a conference seems to indicate that the State Department has no diplomatic policy and is reluctant to provide itself with the facts on which a policy should be based. The government might at least have dispatched a representative who could have

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watched and waited in the interest of a clearer understanding of military and economic conditions in the Balkans.

BELOW, and partly hidden in smoke, are four or five buildings. Not munition factories, one would guess, or railway stations, but buildings in which people live. Above, the sky is obscured by flying machines. Bombs are dropping all over the place. One of the buildings has just been hit. That is the picture. The text says: "Short rations are disagreeable, but the real meaning of the war is not thoroughly understood, nor is the beauty of peace understood, by the British nation of 40,000,000, still almost safe inside of its own frontiers. . . . Fifty thousand German aviators in 50,000 flying machines, each dropping 100 dynamite bombs daily on English soil, will do the work. There is no use camping and killing millions of men in trenches, when the air above the trenches is free." Picture and text appear under this heading: "The way to conquest and peace. Let it rain bombs on England from airplanes." A direct invitation to kill women, children and non-combatant men. Typically German, is it not, in its brutality? But it does not happen to be German this time. It is an appeal to young Americans who might like to become aviators, it has been published in several western papers, it is copyrighted by the Star Company, Great Britain. All we have done is to change a word here and there so as to make the quotations read as if they were taken from a German document. Such a publication is idiotic. Can the men responsible for it really believe they can increase aerial recruiting by telling Americans the lie that an aviator's business is to be the murder of civilians?

NOT the least significant passage in the speech of the new Chancellor of the German Empire was his language in respect to peace without victory. The Germans, he said, were "combatants who had successfully accomplished their purposes and proved themselves invincible." In the first reading this looks like reiteration of the claims of victory which preceded the German peace overture of last December, but it is really something entirely different and something which sounds singularly tame as it falls timidly from the mouth of the spokesman of a conquering war lord. Dr. Michaelis does not claim victory for the German army. He only claims invincibility. This looks to us like a useful shifting of ground. Peace with victory is an exclusive and contentious formula. Peace with invincibility is not. All the belligerent armies except those of the smaller states, which were overwhelmed by mere numbers, can claim to have proved their invincibility. None can claim an incontestable victory. President Wilson might accept Dr. Michaelis's suggested modification of his famous phrase and seek a peace with invincibility for all and victory for none.

SUFFRAGISTS of all opinions have been angered by the picketing incident in Washington. Some are angry because the pickets by embarrassing the administration at a critical period may be making suffrage unpopular. Others are angry because the pickets, during a war for democracy abroad, have been persecuted while agitating for democracy at home. The latter attitude is all the more reasonable because the police did not protect the suffragists in the exercise of their legal right to picket, stood by while rioters attacked them, and then arrested the pickets for causing the riot. But the people who have the best right to be angry are the liberals who put first our success in the war, and want to support the administration to that end. Such people see that every act of petty repression diverts attention from the main issues and creates unnecessary opposition. If the suffrage pickets were embarrassing, their power to embarrass has been doubled by their suppression. The forces who have most embarrassed the administration are those responsible for the action of the Washington police and magistrate.

FOOD control is, for the period of the war, just as definite an administrative field as the army, navy, agriculture or commerce. The need of prompt, responsible executive action is just as urgent. Now, nobody would dream of placing the affairs of the navy or army in the hands of a board, to waste in debate time that means success in war. There is no better reason for substituting a board of three for a responsible food controller. It has been said that endowing a single man, even a man of the breadth of mind and patriotic zeal of Mr. Hoover, with power to regulate the food supply of the nation, would be a step in the direction of autocracy. This is to ignore the fact that ultimate control of this as of every other branch of the administration rests with the President. He can work more effectively through a single administrator than through a board. This relation of food control to the ultimate source of executive authority would be perfectly clear if it had been proposed to make the food controller a member of the Cabinet. Under our system it is not desirable to create temporary Cabinet officers. We should nevertheless recognize that what we need is substantially an executive department, organized according to the plan under which our other executive departments are enabled to do their work.

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EVIDENCE reaches us from many sources that while France, by putting every ounce of her strength into the war, is maintaining her gallant military effort without slackening, she has found increasing difficulty in performing necessary non-military tasks, such as health service and reconstruction. Unless help comes and comes soon it is a condition that is bound to alter for the worse. It would not be easy to overestimate the value of the work being done now by the Rockefeller Foundation and the Red Cross, but the needs of France are too great to be met by these undertakings alone. By further private initiative money must be raised to send to France Americans who cannot fight, but who are willing and are able to do their share in repairing ravages, restoring devastated districts, making French towns and French countryside fit places for man to live and work in. Once the condition of France is thoroughly understood, and the urgency of help thoroughly realized, we believe this money will be given. The United States is in this war not only to fight. As a nation we wish to make the earth a better place than the war would leave it without our aid. We wish especially to do our part toward healing the wounds of France, among all our allies the country which has moved us most to sympathy and admiration. Here is an opportunity to do for France a service vitally necessary.

LACK of tonnage in any quarter of the world serves the purposes of Germany. One of the serious consequences to Germany of a prolonged war is the displacement of German trade in neutral countries by that of her enemies. Much of Germany's hope of prompt economic recovery after the war lies in her selling organization in Latin America and Asia. Down to the present this organization has remained practically intact. It has had a diminishing volume of business on which to subsist, but in this respect its case has not been much worse than that of the selling organizations of Germany's competitors. Through lack of tonnage and exorbitant freights Allied salesmen have been prevented from filling the void created by the blockade of Germany. This is a point that should not be overlooked when we are dealing with the ship-building question. Suppose that certain types of ships that can be quickly constructed without reducing the amount of energy available for other types should prove unable to make the speed necessary to escape the submarines. There is urgent need for their services in other trades than that of the North Atlantic. They can still help to break the determination of Germany to continue the war in hope of winning a German peace.

The New German Attitude

WHATEVER may be the power of political insurgency elsewhere in Europe, in Germany at least the hand that rocks the boat does not rule the world. At a sign from the captain it politely ceases to rock the boat. The speech of the new German Chancellor and its immediate effect in ironing or oiling out the peace agitation looks like an extraordinary anti-climax to the hullabaloo of the past few weeks. He does nothing and says little to satisfy the Reichstag majority in so far as they were agitating for a definition of the war objects of Germany. Yet the majority appears to be satisfied. In his professions about peace the new Chancellor merely dilutes and attenuates the more vigorous language of his predecessor. The Germans will not continue the war for the sake of conquests, but neither will they renounce conquests in order to put an end to the war. They are seeking terms of peace which will guarantee the existence of the German Empire on the continent and over seas, but they are silent about guaranties for the security of any other empire except that of Germany. Peace, the Chancellor says, must offer the foundation of lasting reconciliation of nations, but he does not suggest any principles of international right which might give substance and structure to such a reconciliation and he does not help to bring it into existence by even intimating the willingness of the German government to make one concrete concession in the interest of peace. The object of the speech, like the object of all similar speeches delivered by his predecessor, is not that of removing the obstacles to negotiation with the Allies: it is that of persuading the German people to endure for a few months longer the privations and sufferings demanded by a continuation of the war.

Yet in spite of the apparently complete triumph of the government in allaying the opposition to its equivocal language and policy, it would be a foolish mistake to underestimate the net gain accomplished by the recent agitation. The new Chancellor, it is true, merely dilutes the more vigorous language of his predecessor, but in this instance there is much virtue in dilution. Never has a German Imperial Chancellor answered the enemies of the government at home and abroad with such soft words. A German parliamentary block challenged the Prussian ruling class, and the ruling class have answered the challenge not by defiance and forcible repression but by conciliation and concessions. The government has agreed not to hold another election in Prussia without reforming the class franchise, which hitherto has constituted the impregnable citadel of Prussian autocracy. It has permitted a parliamentary opposition to criticize and to seek a modification of the imperial foreign policy, to an

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extent which heretofore would not have been tolerated, and although it has defeated the attempt it has moved perceptibly in the direction of accepting the purely defensive peace formula of its opponents. Above all it has moderated the haughty and overbearing attitude of von Bethmann-Hollweg. It no longer claims the right to go to the peace conference as a conqueror who is willing to make certain magnanimous concessions to its defeated enemies. All it asks is the chance to negotiate on something like equal terms.

As a result of these concessions it has not placated the socialist agitators. It has merely divided them from their Catholic Centrist associates, who were more willing to be beguiled by soft words and reassuring promises. In this way the government has gained time. Whether it has gained anything but time depends on the military and diplomatic developments of the next few months. If the developments are favorable to Germany, the government can maintain or improve its standing with the German people. But if by the end of the summer no improvement has taken place in the prospects of terminating the war in a manner favorable to Germany, the peace agitators will return to the attack and the government will be unable finally to dodge the issue. It will be obliged either to accept unequivocally the Russian peace formula or to silence its opponents by some measure of political violence.

The German government has obtained its extension of time not only by concessions but by a renewed promise of victory. The large fraction of the peace agitators who belonged to the more conservative parties and who had been converted to peace without annexation, because they believed peace with annexation to be hopeless, have been bought off with rosy prophecies. Neither can there be much doubt as to the calculations on which these improved prospects are based. Dr. Michaelis did not in his speech venture any prophecy of a victory obtained by the submarine. Powerful as it is, it is a weapon of attrition, not of decisive effect. But if the submarine will not bring victory, there is only one other source from which it can be expected to come at any time in the not remote future. The Germans have been preparing to do something to Russia or hear something from Russia which in their opinion would enable them to win a decisive triumph over their enemies. They disarmed the Catholics by a prediction of the immediate disintegration of Russia.

No matter whether their expectations are or are not fulfilled, they are based in one respect on a sound calculation. The Russian Republic is the critically strategic point in the existing military and diplomatic situation. It was the Russian renunciation of annexation which gave the peace agitators in Germany and Austria their courage and their excuse. Yet it is the military weakness of the new republic and its internal disorganization upon which the Germans still chiefly rely for their hope of victory. Whether or not the Germans expect to accelerate this disorganization by attacking Russia or by leaving her as much as possible alone, has until recently been doubtful but certainly in one way or another are counting on emerging victorious from the war as a consequence of defeating the Russian Revolution or of helping the Russian Revolution to defeat itself. This is a matter of life and death for the Prussian ruling class. If the Russian Revolution survives and its leaders organize a working government, the eventual liberalizing of Central Europe looks inevitable. What autocracy in Germany fears most of all and has most reason to fear is a Russian Republic with an inoffensive foreign policy, whose army can fight and whose government can govern. What they will labor and intrigue to bring into existence is either a Russian Republic which is too disorganized to fight or, failing that, a Russian military dictatorship whose loss in moral authority would counterbalance its gain in offensive military power.

The Allies, like the Germans, must treat the Russian Revolution as the key to the situation. The diplomacy during the past few months of the western Allies and the United States has done little to strengthen the Revolution and much to make its survival more difficult. Their reluctance to show any active sympathy for its peace formula has placed obstacles in the way of the preservation of order in Russia and has increased the chances of disorganization and of an ultimate military dictatorship. Their neglect up to date to risk any diplomatic support of the Russian peace initiative has enabled the ruling class in Germany once again to conceal its own intended aggression behind the screen of fear created by the threatened consequence of a victory for the Allies. Thus the Allied diplomacy has done nothing to secure the new Russia from the malevolent vigor of German intrigue and military assault, and the revolution is now fighting for its life with its back to the wall against an appalling array of internal and external enemies. Yet if the Russian Republic should go to pieces or if the Russian Revolution should survive only by means of a military dictatorship, the one great gain of the war would be imperiled or lost. The only possible victory by enemies of Germany would in that event be a victory determined by sheer superiority in military and economic power.

Fortunately it is not too late to reverse this policy. It is not too late to reassure the Russian revolutionary leaders by adopting the spirit, if not

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the letter of the Russian formula. It is not too late to offer guaranties for the future security of all nations, which would help to reunite Russian opinion and divide opinion in Germany. This is the one method of coming to the aid of Russia in her present agony, which remains open to the governments of the western Allies. An offensive in the west would not serve to relieve the pressure in Russia in so far as it is military. But diplomatic support of the Russian peace initiative would serve both to prevent the Germans from driving in a wedge between the Russian government and the Russian people and to aid the Russians in separating the German government from the German people. Mr. Wilson is the one man to undertake such a diplomatic manoeuver. It was he who first insisted on the need of a better definition of war aims and so enabled the Allies to win a substantial diplomatic victory over Germany. It was his letters and speeches of last winter which gave form and substance to the peace formula of the Russian Republic. It was he who introduced into the diplomatic propaganda of the war the constructive distinction between the German people and their government—a distinction which may be rendered either triumphant or impotent by the ability of the Allies to encourage the growth of dissensions in Germany. Now if ever is the time to reap the benefit of his past propaganda. Now if ever is the time for a joint public definition of the objects of the Allies in continuing the war, which may avail to stem the tide of disorganization in Russia and increase its violence in Austria and Germany.

Disposing of Turkey

WHAT is Turkey fighting for? If there is any patriotism among the Turkish leaders, can they contemplate German success with satisfaction? The Germans have never made any secret of the rôle they expected Turkey to occupy in the Central European scheme. Turkey was to be the plunder that would make it worth while for Austria-Hungary and Bulgaria to subordinate their nationalistic whims to German imperialism. In books and pamphlets innumerable Enver Bey and his Germanophile following can read the assumption that Turkey is empty territory, to be colonized by millions of Teutons and Teutonized Slavs, armed to defend themselves against local disorder and the aggressions of competing colonizing empires. What were the Turks to gain from the Bagdad railway, the coal and iron deposits of Anatolia, the wheat and cotton lands of Mesopotamia? Nothing but petty graft, and even this might be expected to be cut off as soon as the number of German settlers became sufficient to bid defiance to the Turks.

It is a natural assumption that the Turkish leaders were partly coerced by the Goeben and the Breslau, partly bribed by German money. Now, there is not the least doubt that the Germans applied coercion and bribery to Turkey, just as they did to Bulgaria, Rumania and Greece. In the case of Bulgaria the Germans were successful, because they could work upon a powerful national interest, the desire of Bulgaria to recover what she regarded as her rights in Macedonia. What Turkish interests were the Germans able to play upon? At the outset it is possible that the Turks may have believed that England could be thrust out of Egypt and the Turkish Empire in Africa restored. But a more vital interest of Turkey was involved. For two centuries her existence had been conditioned by the conflict of purposes among the great Powers. Against the secular ambitions of Russia for Constantinople and the Straits Turkey had no adequate defense in her own resources. What saved her in her recurrent crises with Russia was Austrian, British or French jealousy of Russian aggrandizement. With Russia, France and England allied, and with Austria dismembered as a result of their victory, Turkish diplomacy would have been effectually disarmed. The Allies did indeed assure Turkey that her territorial integrity would be respected if she remained neutral. But for how long a period of time? Not many years might be expected to elapse before the Romanoffs would again move toward Constantinople.

As compared with this danger of Allied victory the danger of German peaceful penetration may well have seemed minor in the eyes of Turkish patriots. The Young Turk nationalists have great confidence in the vigor and independence of the Anatolian population. In Europe the Turks were never more than a fragment of the population. They were an army of occupation, exposed to the degenerative forces of such a status. It was no great wonder that they should in the end have been expelled by the sounder subject populations, supported by one or more of the Christian Powers. But in Anatolia much of the population is Turkish from the ground upward. Foreign elements might be introduced to exploit the natural resources of the land, but such exploitation would entail an improvement in the economic condition and increase in number of the Anatolian Turks. The Germans meant to reserve for themselves all the benefits of Turkish exploitation. But it is not unlikely that Enver Bey and such members of his party as were not pro-German through corruption looked beyond German penetration to a regenerated Turkey able to recover her patrimony from an alien control. It

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was a desperate gamble, but not one that was absolutely hopeless.

Since Turkey's entrance into the war the Russian menace to Turkish integrity has been removed through revolution. The German menace has become more and more ominous. Failing to make substantial gains elsewhere, the Germans must find compensation for their losses in Turkey. With a few hundred thousand armed colonists in Turkey, Germany would have come near expelling the British from Egypt and India in this war. The colonists will be at hand before the next war, if the Turks can be made to submit to colonization.

Turkey does not lack statesmen who are shrewd and, after an oriental fashion, patriotic. What the changes resulting from the Russian Revolution mean for Turkey can not have escaped them. But now a new danger threatens them, and holds them firm to their alliance with the Germans. This is dismemberment at the hands of the Western Allies. England, France, Italy and Greece have agreed, so it is generally believed, upon their respective shares in the Turkish spoil. Without this danger it can scarcely be believed that Turkey would fight on.

The Allies are abundantly justified in taking such measures as may be necessary to prevent Turkey from becoming a German colony after the war. As every one can now see, a German Turkey would be a perpetual menace to the peace of the world. But it is a question whether dismemberment would be the policy best adapted to exclude German intrigue. Turks have never lived contentedly under alien domination. They emigrated from Crete en masse when the island was lost to Turkey. There was a huge emigration of Turks from Macedonia and Thrace after the Balkan wars. It can not be supposed that they would accept tamely the status of subjects of the western Powers. They would strive for unity and independence, and Germany, however thoroughly she might be beaten in this war, would manage to avail herself of such strivings.

Neither could the Allies afford to make peace with Turkey, leaving the organization of the empire as it stands. The world has had more than enough of the iniquities of Byzantine despotism. But Turkey needs peace so desperately that she would probably submit to a reconstruction of her empire on a federal basis, leaving to Constantinople little more than a shadow of authority over Arabia, Mesopotamia, Syria and Armenia. Under such a federal organization the existing potential nationalities would stand a chance of developing into real nations.

Mere political reorganization would not of course be sufficient to exclude future German designs. The economic development of Turkey must somehow be made possible. Railways must be built, mines opened, deserts reclaimed. But all this can be done as well under international auspices as under national. The railway from Constantinople to the Persian Gulf must be completed in any event. Under international control this railway would serve to insure Turkey against the imperialistic designs of any one nation.

Suppose that Turkey were offered an immediate peace on condition that the pro-German faction, whether corrupt or not, be thrown out of power, that all German concessionary rights be transferred to the league of the Allies or with their consent cancelled in favor of Turkey herself, and that the empire submit to a political reorganization insuring the autonomy of non-Turkish nationalities. Would the Turks reject such an offer? This is not probable. And with Turkey out of the war, Bulgaria would not be averse to peace negotiations. The imposing edifice of the Pan-Germanists would collapse of its own weight.

For her weakness, her folly and her crimes, it may be said, Turkey merits extinction, not a new lease of life under conditions more favorable than ever before. This we freely admit. But it seldom pays to seek retribution when a nation is the culprit. For her arrogant pride and brutal egotism Bulgaria merited the humiliation and loss inflicted upon her in the second Balkan war. Yet there is not a candid student of Balkan affairs to-day who does not regret the harshness of the terms imposed upon Bulgaria in the treaty of Bucharest. Serbia and Rumania have paid heavily for their momentary aggrandizement: England, France and Russia are paying heavily for permitting the treaty to stand. The peace of the world is worth more than the merited punishment of Turkey.

Food and the Future

SOME economic and social war measures are emergency affairs. They mark temporary necessities surging into the normal business of life and we can only look forward to the time when they shall not be needed. But many of these changes are intrinsically desirable. Under ordinary circumstances the tide of routine sets too strongly for them to be accomplished. War conditions certainly tighten and harden many things, but they loosen the bonds of custom, whether of action or of imagination. Fences come down, wandering lanes are straightened. Organization is introduced where the rule of thumb of past accidents had governed: isolation gives way to coöperation. Public foresight and planning encroach on the private manipulation of secret circumstance.

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Hence the policy of the liberal in war time must be twofold. He must be aggressively alert that war emergencies are not made an excuse for an undoing of what has been won for progress at a great price. He must insist that temporary concessions to the demands of an efficient unity are not strained till they become permanent menaces to liberty. But he must also borrow the wisdom of the serpent from " practical men." He must figure how he too may turn conditions to account so as to put things across that do not get readily done under ordinary circumstances. He must see to it that the children of light are not outgamed in the rivalry to get changes made by the children of darkness. If the latter win, it is not the fault of war, but of the sloth of the radical, sloth in imaginative vision if not in outer action.

These considerations apply nowhere more than to the proper policy to be followed in the production and distribution of food. Some things have to be done merely because of the present world shortage and the acutely abnormal conditions of war. But it is also doubtful if anything in this country more needed a radical shock and shaking up than everything which relates to the economics of agricultural production and distribution. The delay in Washington in dealing with the question of food control was irritating, it was hateful. But it measures something of the importance of the issues and forces involved. If bills for raising and expending large sums of money do not arouse so much excitement nor such bitterness, it is largely because the forces operative in matters of food have not been faced in the past to the same extent as have questions of taxation and debts, obscure as the latter still are. Our national habit of mind as to agricultural production and the marketing of its commodities has lagged in the happy-go-lucky optimism and laissez-faire of pioneer times, and we still walk the grooves of action which were then trodden. The fact that the war has revealed the food question as the primary question is of inestimable significance simply as a challenge to inquiry and thought.

Here are two illustrations of the extent to which it has been ignored. Our Made-in-Germany socialistic agitation has been preoccupied with questions of factory production and distribution. Save for an occasional sentimental sop and appeal, the farmer and the farm laborer have not figured in the proletariat. Apparently just because the agrarian interest in Germany has been conservative and junkerish, it has been assumed that the agricultural interest in this country was hopelessly bourgeois, so far as it was not merely negligible. The enormous difference of conditions in agricultural production in this country and Europe have been passed over—the differences made, for example, by the large-scale production of grain, cattle and hogs in the West and by the seriousness of the ever-present problem of transportation to market. Yet there are potentialities for social unrest and change in the economic agricultural situation which outrun those in the immediate factory situation. Of them the Populist movement was only a superficial indication, for save as it touched upon money and (to a slight extent) upon transportation it was hardly class-conscious, to borrow socialistic phraseology, at all. The very things that largely turned the conventional socialist away from the farmer, his traditional individualism of isolation, his thoroughly respectable moral code, were the very things which might have made for the development of an indigenous socialism, if the city-made and factory-made socialism imported from Germany had shown any power of intellectual flexibility.

The other illustration is local. The question of rapid transit for persons, the street-car question in one form or another, has been a burning question for years in the municipal politics of every large city. It is not probable that the question of legs is more vital in the administration of city conditions than that of the belly. Yet only sporadically has the question of food supply, the question of the city's receipt, storage and marketing of food, been even an academic issue in municipal politics. Consider the amount of thought, energy and public money which has gone into the subway matter in New York City compared with that which has gone into that of markets! Yet it is hard to believe that the reason for the neglect of the latter is more than conventional. The changes made in modern living by the transformation of transportation are recent and striking. But persons have always bought food in the stores and consumed it in the home, and we have assumed the perpetuation of established customs in their respect, although the impact of new industrial methods is just as important here as it is in ways of getting from place to place. But only when a scarcity of food has incited a riot, or a sudden rise in the price of milk or meat has irritated us, have we taken any collective heed of the radical change as to food.

The war has at least made us all think food and talk food. Now it may not be wholly idle to point out that food is grown on farms by farmers, and not, for the most part, in back-lots or roof-gardens by amateurs. Obvious as is the fact, it may at least call attention to the further fact that under our economic conditions the question of the production of food is bound up with the question of its transportation and marketing. If the farmer can be assured of his market at a reasonable profit there is no more occasion for recourse to exhorta-

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tion in the farming business than there is in that of producing calico or barrels. But the agricultural problem will never be settled on the farm, not even with the aid of all possible improvements in the scientific management of soil, stock and seeds. It will be settled at the other end, at the distributing and marketing end. The radical, the progressive, who fails to utilize the war emergency so as to get something done which will make an abiding difference in methods of getting the ultimate producer and the ultimate consumer together, eliminating the speculators and the parasites who now batten on both, fails to grasp one of the greatest opportunities of the war condition. He also fails to get in line with what in all human probability is the next determining movement in American politics—the business awakening of the farmer.

Socialist Sectarianism

THE Rand School of Social Science has just issued a Documentary History of the Attitude of the Socialist Party toward the War. As a record of the mental processes of the "only important organized force in America to maintain an active opposition after our country has entered into the world carnival of slaughter," the volume has a peculiar interest. Nothing that has been published by the Socialists or their critics does so much to explain why the Socialist party has never taken firm root in America. Nothing does so much to explain why at a time when the compulsion of events is turning America toward collectivism and the democratic control of industry, the influence of this "party of the working class" upon the industrial and economic evolution of the country is so nearly negligible. Incidentally the history is valuable because of the light it throws upon the tragic events that threaten to subvert the splendid first fruits of the Russian Revolution.

The history is a record of a sect which refuses to permit facts to shake its faith in the metaphysical dogmas of an inherited creed. In his introduction, Mr. Morris Hillquit, the ablest American exponent of the socialist catechism, announces the text which the party has adopted as its infallible guide:

> The socialist opposition to war, he writes, is based not merely on humanitarian grounds, potent and compelling as these are, but principally on the deep-rooted conviction that modern wars are at the bottom sanguinary struggles for the commercial advantages of the possessing classes, and that they are disastrous to the cause of the workers, their struggles and aspirations, their rights and liberties.

Before this sweeping dogma all distinctions between the motives and aims of the belligerents fade into insignificance. France, England and Germany are equally the victims of capitalistic selfishness, cunning and greed. The ultimatum to Serbia and the invasion of Belgium are on a par with the "murder" of the helpless conscripts whose mangled bodies strew the hillsides of Galicia and the Somme. Mr. Hillquit concedes that Germany was primarily responsible for the *immediate* outbreak of the war; that her conduct of the war has been unusually ruthless, and that a decisive victory of German arms would be harmful to human civilization and social progress. But in his opinion, as in the opinion of all orthodox Socialists, it does not follow that Germany or the German autocracy was essentially more responsible for the war than the capitalistic governments of England, Russia and France. The ruling classes of each leading country, the powers of money, industry and trade, had been reaching out for the commercial control of the world, and in all cases the governments were primarily the agents of these interests.

> Thus war was systematically prepared and organized by the governments of the great European nations in the course of many years. *It was due about* 1914. Somebody *had to* begin it. It happened to be the government of Germany that took the odium of the initiative. The Imperial German government may be the immediate criminal in the world tragedy. But the governments of all other great European Powers are accessories before the fact, and back of all of them and damning all of them lies the compelling motive for the crime—the greed of international capitalist competition.

Arguing from these premises, a decisive victory for the Allies would be quite as disastrous to the progress of social democracy as a decisive victory for Germany.

For the Socialists, this deep rooted conviction resolves all the perplexing and complicated questions which the war has stirred up in the minds of unbelievers. For them the issue of Democracy versus Autocracy is nothing but the "iridescent garb of lofty idealism" in which the profiteers have ever sought to clothe "every great national or international iniquity." They believe that as governments are organized to-day all wars are the negation of democracy. Capitalism knows no country. It is the same in France and England as in Germany and America. For it national boundaries and the "sham patriotism" that goes with them are merely the walls behind which competing groups mature their murderous plots of self-aggrandisement. Wars will inevitably recur until the workers of all nations awaken to their common interest in peace, rise against their masters, and establish "The Brotherhood of Man, the

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Federation of the World." The only present hope of democracy lies in the collapse of the war through the refusal of the workers to fight their masters' battles. When the workers lay down their arms and extend the hand of comradeship in emulation of the Russian workers in Galicia, capitalism will totter on its throne and the dawn of permanent universal peace will be at hand.

It is this same deep rooted conviction which explains the program to which the Socialists have consistently adhered since the outbreak of the war, and which led them on the 14th of August, 1914, to adopt as their slogan: "Starve the War and Feed America."

In advocating an embargo upon the shipment of foodstuffs from America to England they did not fail to realize that any such action if taken by the American government would redound to the immediate advantage of Germany; but they were consistent in holding that no evil could be so great or so disastrous to the working class of England and France as a continuation of the war. They believed that democracy could not be imposed upon Germany from without, that it could be won only by the efforts of the German working-class itself and that the overwhelming defeat of Germany would only serve to strengthen the romantic allegiance of the German people to their rulers. And as for the workers of England, France and Italy, as well as for the workers and peasants of Russia a decisive victory for the Allies would only fasten the chains of capitalist bondage more securely upon them. Their slogan was not inspired by any special leanings towards Germany but by their religious faith in the virtues of internationalism and their uncompromising hatred of all war.

Again in September of the same year they "offered their deepest sympathy and their brotherly hand" to the workers of both the neutral and the belligerent countries in an effort to reestablish the International Socialist Bureau and to put an end to the "mass murder" that was devastating Europe.

> We know, they said, that no nation can gain by the continuation of this war. What rewards and advantages may come from it will go to the ruling classes: all the sacrifices, sufferings and sorrows it will entail will fall to the lot of the workers.

In May, 1915, the destruction of the Lusitania instead of stirring them to condemnation of Germany led them to call with renewed energy upon the people of the United States and particularly upon the workers to oppose America's participation in the war.

"The killing of hundreds of non-combatants, men, women and children on board the steamer, brings more closely home to us the fiendish savagery of warfare and should inspire us with stronger determination than ever to maintain peace and civilization at any cost."

When finally the United States was drawn into the war they solemnly reaffirmed their "allegiance to the principle of internationalism and working-class solidarity the world over, and their unalterable opposition to the war just declared by the government of the United States."

From the day of the first declaration of war in Europe to the present moment orthodox American Socialists have been consistent in their opposition to war as a crime which so greatly transcends all other crimes that those who take part in it are all sinners alike. To condemn them as pro-German is as unjust as to convict the Quakers as such of treason. As with all true disciples, their creed blinds them to those "minor" distinctions between right and wrong which in an imperfect world are the only possible guides to human conduct. For the vast majority of healthy-minded men and women the world over, including a considerable minority of the German people themselves, the decisive fact is that the German autocracy, as the Socialists themselves concede, was primarily responsible for the war. They will be confirmed in the soundness of their normal reaction to this immediate fact by the spectacle of German regiments, with thousands of professing Socialists in their ranks, trampling over the bodies of Russian soldiers who in obedience to the preaching of Socialist sectarians lay down their arms and refuse to fight. The Documentary History of the Attitude of the American Socialist Party toward the War is a singular illustration of the power of dogmatic morality to lead its converts into the metaphysical limbo where all humanly tangible distinctions between good and evil disappear.

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Wanted—A Policy

ALL roads at Washington passing through administrative difficulties and delays lead at last to one terminal—to the one organic change without which all mechanical props, such as the summoning of a Great Man spectacularly to build a Great Fleet, are soon seen to be actually fresh impairments of harmony and fresh impediments to convenience and dispatch.

During the last month one of our chief administrative difficulties and delays, one of our chief administrative emotional disturbances, has circled about the prices of our primary industrial commodities—steel, copper, lumber, oil, coal, and the like. Our industrial magnates, in the very midst of their sanctification by the official hands which have conferred upon them the total management of our most moral enterprise, the Red Cross, have been morally devastated by thunderings and lightnings equally official against the quality of their "patriotism" in the prices of the supplies desired by the government for the conduct of the war. Why?

It cannot be because the government lacks the legal physical power to protect itself against exactions. The act of June 30th, 1916, authorizes it to proceed to any producer and to address him in the terms following: "You are capable of producing a thing I want. You will produce it. You may find it necessary to remodel your plant. You will remodel it. You may find it necessary to abandon your other customers. You will abandon them. You will produce for me, and for me alone, if I tell you to, and, finally, you will produce at a price that I shall fix. The act says that it shall be a price 'just and fair.' But the act says also that I am the judge of fairness and the judge of justness. The product you make is mine and the price you get is mine. And if you raise your hand to thwart me, I will punish you. I will punish you by fining you $50,000. I will punish you by jailing you for three years. And I will punish you by taking your plant away from you and by hiring your managers and engineers and workmen to labor for me instead of for you. You will be out (that is, out of your plant but not out of jail), and I will be in, and I will then pay you nothing but a 'rental,' a 'just and fair' rental, fixed by me."

If a government so circumstanced gives it out that its pockets are being pathetically picked, if a man armed with a six-cylinder revolver and explosive bullets is seen weeping bitterly in protest against the ruthless attacks of a man armed with a bank-deposit slip and a calm cold eye, the mind of the spectator leaps instantly to the surmise that the defenselessness of the victim must be due not so much to a lack of outward preparedness as to a lack of inward conscious cohesive purpose; and this surmise, in the case of the government, is more than a surmise; it is a proved fact.

It is proved by the purchases made by our chief purchasers, Mr. Baker and Mr. Daniels. Each of these men is as honest as the other—namely, totally honest, with an honesty most unusually positive and aggressive. Nevertheless the War Department and the Navy Department are sometimes quite strikingly at variance in their views of price, in their views of the method of arriving at a "fair" price, a "just" price. This could not be if the government, as a government, had a known price method, binding on its chief purchasers. The government, as a government, has none.

It is proved by the experience of the coal operators. At one conference, after listening to speeches by Mr. Lane of the Cabinet, and by Mr. Fort of the Federal Trade Commission, they allow their minds to meet as to price. In the next conference, after listening to a speech by Mr. Daniels of the Cabinet and to a set of most particularly forceful speeches by that most particularly forceful person, Mr. Colver of the Federal Trade Commission, they vigorously prevent their minds from meeting as to price. On one occasion they are wafted toward a joint-price and on the next occasion they are red-flagged away from it. This could not be if the government, as a government, had a known price-method, binding on all members of the Cabinet and on all members of the Federal Trade Commission. The government, as a government, has none.

It is proved by the experiences of the business men who constitute the committees of the Council of National Defense and of the Advisory Commission of the Council of National Defense and who do their work as subordinates of the Council and under the eyes of the members of the Council, including Mr. Baker and Mr. Daniels. These business men may be enlightened or unenlightened, patriots or pirates. They remain in Washington at the will of the government and of the Council. As subordinates of the Council, they confer with producers and they report back from producers to the War Department and to the Navy Department. They then sometimes find, as in the case of Mr. Baruch and his latest efforts in copper, that the price which the producers have been per-

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suaded to accept is based on a principle utterly unacceptable either to Mr. Baker or to Mr. Daniels. And they continuously find that for being in Washington at the will of the government and of the Council, and for reporting to the War Department and to the Navy Department at the request of the government and of the Council, it is their almost daily duty to be thrown to the lions and devoured on the floor of the Senate by Democratic senators without one word of protest or protection from either Mr. Baker or Mr. Daniels. This could not be if the government, as a government, had a known price-method binding on all members of the Council. The government, as a government, has none.

It is proved by the famous speech on prices addressed by Mr. Wilson to his fellow-countrymen. That speech did indeed reveal one perfectly solid and yet dazzlingly brilliant piece of new policy. "We must make the prices to the public the same as the prices to the government." There shone Mr. Wilson's genius at its brightest of political discernment and declaration. Certainly the private buyers of the United States, when once the government is buying at prices known to be "just," will not contentedly buy at higher prices thereby known to be "unjust." In one sentence Mr. Wilson boldly and conclusively extinguished the hope entertained in many quarters that a commercial favoritism to our relatively few citizens on service in France might patriotically purchase a commercial impoverishment of the mass of our people elsewhere. But when, leaving the political question of price-equality, Mr. Wilson discussed the administrative question of price-method, he struck no flint and shed no light whatever. The words with which he amplified the word "just" were applauded with equal certainty by editors of papers that wish prices to be bottomlessly low and by editors of papers that wish prices to be rooflessly high. Administratively, Mr. Wilson disclosed only a price-aspiration, not a price-method of any sort.

Many sorts exist, in the imagination. There is the "common sense" method. Inquiries into cost, it is held, are endless and fruitless. The market is a sufficient teacher. One morning's study of the recent bulge of the market in previously profitable commodities such as iron ore and pig iron shows when every conceivable allowance has been generously made for every element of increase in the cost of production, the present price still contains a viciously thick margin of indubitable velvet. Take an axe (no other instrument could be so appropriate) and shear that margin off. It can be done quickly. The price resulting will have the merit simply of ceasing to shock the common sense and the moral sense of the community. It will leave unknown profits, of course, in the pockets of the producers. But Congress will excavate them with an infinite variety of taxes.

There is the "top cost" method. The first part of the President's speech on prices gave considerable comfort to advocates of this method. In every industry, among all the plants that must remain in existence in order to give us our desired grand total output, find the one that has the "top cost" of production. To that "top cost" add a "normal" profit. The sum is your "just" price. It barely keeps the "top cost" plant going. If it were lower, that plant would have to stop. It gives that plant a living. It therefore gives every other plant more than a living. It gives the plant with the "bottom cost" a very fat living. But again Congress will tax; and, in this case, it will tax with a special definite tax directed at special quite definite earnings.

There is the "government pool" method. It is in high favor in certain offices of the Federal Trade Commission. Let the government establish a pool of its own which will give it a momentary book-keeping ownership of each of the most important primary commodities on their way from production to consumption. Let the government buy from each individual producer at this ascertained individual cost of production plus a "normal" profit, and let it sell to the public and itself at one consolidated averaged price lying somewhere in the neighborhood of the middle line between highest cost level and the lowest. This will give everybody a lower price than could be given any other way. It will, of course, however, by eliminating all "excess" profits in each of the commodities which it touches, rob Congress of one of its largest and easiest sources of revenue. But Congress will have to find new sources.

There are other methods. Each of them is alluring. Each of them is alarming. To examine them thoroughly, to calculate their consequences, to choose between them, to adapt them to our present circumstances in such a way as to avoid, if possible, the great calamities with which governmental price-fixing has almost always been attended —this is a labor demanding continuous and prolonged thought from persons with the time for it.

Therefore it is proposed that there shall be a Price Board reporting to the President. Yes. One more mechanical prop. One more thing ostensibly to hold up the President's hands but really to clutter them.

The Cabinet departments report to the President. Numerous other bodies report to the President—the Tariff Commission, the Interstate Commerce Commission, the Federal Trade Com-

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mission, and others, including the Shipping Board and also, in fact, that aspect of the Shipping Board called the Emergency Fleet Corporation. And at the top of each of these groups are men as busy as the squirrels in Lafayette Park burying each his winter store of nuts. Mr. Baker must give his personal attention to the manuscripts of pamphlets of instruction and encouragement to be distributed among the boys who have been drafted. Mr. Daniels must give his personal attention to the problem of chasing girls away from sailors. Each group, each head of each group, sees perhaps a half, a quarter, a tenth, a twentieth, of any one really great national policy. He runs with that fraction of it to the White House.

The Federal Trade Commission is studying the course of certain primary commodities. As it finishes each inquiry into each cost it will take it voluminously and lay it in a basket at the side door of the White House. Mr. Wilson will examine it. He will send it on after a while to the Prices Board. There will be a row in the Prices Board on policy or between the Prices Board and the Federal Trade Commission on the interpretation of facts, and there will be nothing to stand between that row and Mr. Wilson, who at that moment will be struggling with at least six weeks arrearages of rows from other quarters.

"He has no ministers," said a member of one of the missions in Washington from the continent of Europe. "To get anything important arranged I must see him. When I see him, I see a very great man. But he cannot let me see him every day. Of course not. So here I am. And the arrangements are not made."

For price, as for everything else having to do with the conduct of the war, the first thing needed is not the creation of a new independent roving administrative board but the transformation of the Council of National Defense genuinely into a policy board—exploring policy—presenting policy explored to the President for his approval—transmitting policy approved to administrative boards subject to its influence—holding these boards authoritatively to whatever policy the President may have laid down—driving them—harmonizing them.

The Shipping Board has become the untamable Albania of Washington. Surely our stock of such principalities is now large enough. Surely we need an organic control of them. Where is that control possible for the war, except in the Council? Under the Council, under the Council changed from a group of merely individual administrators to a group of collective directors, is surely the place for the Prices Board.

WILLIAM HARD.

The Embargo

BECAUSE it is chiefly by guesswork that we estimate how considerably the exports of neutral Europe are contributing to the enemy offensive, the political and economic purposes of an American embargo are confusing. Assertions that importation from this country permits a turnover of enough food to supply minimum rations to two and a quarter million German soldiers are answered by the agents of neutral governments with a claim that increased American trade has not managed even to replace lost commerce from other nations which was relied upon for the necessities of existence. American trade, they believe, is already at a minimum. They point to our own records to show that while the neutrals of Europe are receiving more of our foodstuffs now than in the period before the war, they are receiving thirty per cent less wheat, flour, corn and cotton-seed cake than in 1915, sixty per cent less bacon, and only a sixth as much lard. On their own records, filed with our Department of Commerce, they would build the other side of the case: Holland, for instance, asserting that while in 1914 she sent 130 tons of fresh fruits into Germany, in 1916 she shipped but 78—that in the same period her exports of wheat to Germany fell from 44,000,000 bushels to the negligible total of 698. "Speaking generally," declared Lord Robert Cecil, Minister of Blockade, "and aside from the petty smuggling which will always exist, the neutrals have not sold any appreciable quantity of imported goods to Germany. Their trade consists almost entirely of their own goods. Moreover, they have not even replaced such exports with imported goods, except indirectly. Certainly they have imported fodder and sold pigs, but it is difficult to stretch the doctrine of enemy destination to cover this point."

Unfortunately for the case of the neutrals, it is not upon the doctrine of enemy destination that the present policy of our government can be plotted. Decreasing importation from this country, and, even if convincingly demonstrated, decreasing exportation into Germany, are not central considerations. At the bottom are the facts that the United States holds practically absolute control of the world's food surplus, and that since we have gone into war we cannot be other than discriminating in our disposal of it. Assume that not a pound of our own foodstuffs crosses into Germany, and there is still presented a problem in deciding to what extent the neutral nations, for their own use and for an indirect replacement of their export trade, should be permitted to share in our meagre surplus.

Since an embargo policy is not incidentally but

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primarily a matter of politics, it should be recognized that the neutrals contiguous to Germany are in a difficult position. If diplomatic coercion is not continually active there is at least the fact that they must look to Germany for many of the essentials of their industries. Norway's need of raw zinc is an instance; in the year in which the war started, Norwegian manufacturers were importing eighteen thousand tons of zinc, and more than three-fourths of it came from Germany. All of the neutrals depend upon textile fabrics, metals and manufactures of metals, chiefly of German derivation. No one, it is said, would find fault if Germany should continue to send her zinc into Norway and her textiles into Denmark. But to make amends for the exodus of such products in a time of war, Germany is likely to insist upon a substantial return in the way of what she most needs—iron ore from Sweden, and foodstuffs wherever they can be picked up.

If we or our allies could do what we were not able to do in a time of peace—supply the industrial needs of the neutrals from our own stock—there would still remain the fact that the neutrals could not abruptly discontinue a trade established with Germany, long before the war, without meeting serious diplomatic objection. In a natural and legitimate desire not to see our own limited supply made part of a German offensive, we are too likely to conceive of trade between the European neutrals and Germany as principally an outgrowth of the British blockade. The fact is that when Europe was at peace Germany of all the major Powers was first in trade with the neutrals on her borders. In 1913 and 1914, before the war, the value of her total trade with Denmark was 355 million dollars, as compared with 181 millions for Great Britain. During the same years she stood first in her exports to Sweden, Norway, Denmark and Holland; first in what she imported from Holland, and second in her imports from the other three. Whatever the course of the neutrals during the war, they had at its outbreak the necessity of custom in keeping up their trade with Germany, and the risk of unneutrality in letting it drop. Their choice, once the blockade was upon Germany, was to keep alive an established trade by exporting to a high market, or to be marked as hostile by Germany for their pains in cutting down the importation of their own essentials.

In reaching the policy of an American embargo, these considerations cannot be laid aside. They are secondary, but they cannot be considered apart from the more basic facts: that the resources of America and of the Allies are pooled; and that despite any desire on our part to befriend the neutrals scarcity of surplus may force a limitation of its distribution to those who are contributors. Is there a contribution which we can attempt to secure from the neutrals, valuable enough to us to warrant their participation in a division, if that division comes to be made upon minimum shares?

Obviously we can attempt to force as a contribution an embargo upon neutral trade with Germany. To weigh the merits of such a purpose we need consider neither the extent to which Germany has already gone in exerting pressure from her side, nor the international morality that is involved. For the political situation is almost as far as we need look. In view of the past reliance of the neutrals upon Germany, economically, and the political implications of their long-standing trade with her, what would be the probable outcome of a neutral embargo upon trade with Germany? For us to withhold our foodstuffs from Sweden until that nation had abandoned the ore exports for which Germany has such good purposes would be practically equivalent to demanding a declaration of war. With such a choice, Sweden would be likely to be forced over to the side of the Central Powers. Holland would cling to her neutrality in the face of severe pressure. But Holland with her lot thrown in on the side of the Allies would be a doubtful asset.

It is not in belligerency but in tonnage that means to realize a neutral contribution are suggested. In July, 1916, the Scandinavian countries and Holland possessed an aggregate of 6,000,000 tons of shipping, acting chiefly as carriers in provisioning the members of the Allied group with raw materials and foodstuffs in exchange for manufactures. It was the German proclamation of February 1st which took a large part of this tonnage from the sea. Holland and Denmark did not feel themselves able to disregard both German economic pressure and the risks of unrestricted submarine warfare; Sweden, with an eye to profits after the war, has followed a policy of extreme caution. Only Norway has been willing on a large scale to risk her shipping. A million or a million and a half of tonnage has probably been lost to the Allies in the success of Germany's warning to the neutrals.

With freight charges from this country to England more than twelve times what they were in 1914, with new needs being created by the presence of an American army in France, the addition of a million tons to the purposes of Allied shipping would be worth more than a belligerency on the part of neutral Europe. Though the attrition of England by submarine warfare does not seem as possible as it did some time ago, the delay with which our own shipping authorities are inaugurating a program still seems the worst failure of

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our early participation in the war. If the Scandinavian countries and Holland would agree to risk the placing of their tonnage under American-Allied control, why should they not deserve to share in a surplus of food and raw materials?

The establishment of neutral shipping under such a control would demand first, a willingness on the part of the neutrals, and then an acceptance of such a situation by Germany; it may be said, however, that one answer fits both of the queries raised. For if in making such an agreement the neutrals should run no other risks than the ordinary risks of loss by submarine attack, there would be no doubt of their willingness to be a party to the venture. At least there would be no doubt of their having been offered an honest opportunity. For they would have been asked to accept in the most practical manner the logic that in a limited surplus only contributors can share. Politically, and morally, too, there is a wide difference between forcing a nation to risk ships of a given value for products of a given value, and coercing a weak and unwilling neutral into a war of competitive attrition.

It is certain that Germany would regard an arrangement such as this with disfavor, and likely that it would seem to her more disastrous than an actual declaration of war on the part of the neutrals—which, though putting ships at the Allies' disposal, would perhaps offer compensation in opening new lands to the German offensive, which would almost certainly be the first in the field. For, in this case, there would be no reason for such an opportunity. All of the neutral shipping, practically, is privately owned, and there is in the international code no disapproval of either the sale or the rental of a merchant vessel to a belligerent government. During the past year, while we were at peace, private ship owners and builders of our own country sold vessels aggregating seventy thousand tons to individuals of belligerent nations and to belligerent nations themselves. But it would not be necessary to go so far as to institute chartering by the belligerent governments. It is quite fair to say to the neutrals that if they desire to share in the exports of the United States and of the Allies, it is their part to come for them with the ships which have been sheltered from the risks of submarine warfare. In this manner American and Allied ships would be released from service not only between the neutrals and the United States, but between the neutrals and the Allies. The addition would be to our great advantage; its gain would be a violation of international law in neither text nor spirit. In the difficult question of an embargo it is not easy to see a policy that fits better the various problems—that leaves to the neutrals that part of their trade with Germany which can legitimately be maintained, and be discontinued only at the risk of a break—and that permits the befriending of smaller nations with no prodigality in our own limited supply. In some variation of this policy there lies perhaps the best means for an expression of the President's declaration that it is "our wish and purpose to supply the neutral nations whose people depend upon us as nearly in proportion to their need as the amount to be divided permits."

CHARLES MERZ.

Jane Austen

WEDNESDAY, July 18th, was the hundredth anniversary of Jane Austen's death. Who reads her nowadays? Exactly, one might answer, the same persons who have always read her. Yet it would be absurd to imply by this that her admirers are all alike. Few in number, they are found among all sorts and conditions of men and women. Sir Walter Scott, Archbishop Whately and Macaulay, whom Henry James has called "her first slightly ponderous amoroso," Tennyson and Goldwin Smith, Mrs. Henry W. Taft and Mr. Howells and Dean Briggs of Harvard—what have they in common except their pleasure in Miss Austen's comedy and neatness?

Different as her lovers are, what they love in her are always the same things, for which their affection is unchanging and genuine. Has any other English writer as famous tempted so few readers to affect a liking they have not? Some readers she has, no doubt, who are fond of saying they could never have done this, never have endured that, were it not for their sense of humor, but they are not many. Antipathy to comedy is too natural, widespread and strong for this special affectation, with its meagre rewards and its painful gestures, ever to have been the mode.

Is it true that more votes would be cast, if a vote were to decide which of the novels is her masterpiece, for Pride and Prejudice and for Emma than for any of the others? I think so, if you will allow me to guess, which is really all that any one can do in the premises. If you will look at the novels you will notice, as many readers have noticed in every generation, that Emma and Pride and Prejudice stand apart from the rest in this: Each is a comedy of mistakes, a word one uses more naturally, when one is speaking of Miss Austen, than illusion or delusion. In Pride and Prejudice Elizabeth misjudges the characters of two men, Darcy and Wickham. Each of these errors fosters the other. Miss Austen shows us each from its beginning to its end. Emma's central mistake is of

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a different character. The only difference between her estimates of Mr. Knightly at the beginning and at the end of the novel is made by her discoveries first that she loves him and secondly that he loves her. Until she has been enlightened on these points she has enough free attention to make many other mistakes. In Emma and Pride and Prejudice mistakes are represented with a fulness which gives these two books a special and intellectual interest, if an interest in true-to-type comedy is ever intellectual.

One of Miss Austen's genuine admirers, Mr. A. B. Walkley, is almost as fond of quoting Aristotle as of quoting her, and each habit has its good points. Taken together, they give one an excuse for saying that Miss Austen likes to represent a quality in its virtuous mean and in its excess. Many of her heroines value the competence she likes to give them by marriage or inheritance or both. Elizabeth Bennet was not sorry that Darcy had ten thousand pounds a year. During their engagement she looked forward "to all the comfort and elegance of their family party of Pemberley." Her mother, who had called Darcy "that disagreeable man," took the news of Elizabeth's engagement in this way: "Oh, my sweetest Lizzy! how rich and how great you will be! What pin-money, what jewels, what carriages you will have! . . . I am so pleased—so happy! Such a charming man!—so handsome! so tall!—Oh, my dear Lizzy! pray apologize for my having disliked him so much before. I hope he will overlook it."

No one in Miss Austen is more excessively in love than Marianne Dashwood: "Marianne would have thought herself very inexcusable had she been able to sleep at all the first night after parting from Willoughby. She would have been ashamed to look her family in the face the next morning, had she not risen from her bed in more need of repose than when she lay down in it. But the feelings which made such composure a disgrace left her in no danger of incurring it." Contrast this excess of sensibility with the virtuous mean. Anne Elliot, separated for years from Wentworth, to whom she had once been engaged, and now meeting him again in Bath, is sought in marriage by her cousin: "How she might have felt had there been no Captain Wentworth in the case, was not worth enquiry; for there was a Captain Wentworth; and be the conclusion of the present suspense good or bad, her affection would be his for ever. Their union, she believed, could not divide her more from other men than their final separation. Prettier musings of high-wrought love and eternal constancy could never have passed along the streets of Bath than Anne was sporting with from Camden Place to Westgate Buildings. It was almost enough to spread purification and perfume all the way."

Miss Austen values ability to perceive the comic. She values it for its own sake, because perception of the comic is delightful to her, and also because the comic spirit enables those whom it touches to escape such excesses of egotism as conceit, boastfulness, pride, callousness. Yet no novelist has been more aware of the general futility which may accompany a sense of humor. Mr. Bennet almost did live to laugh at his neighbors, at his daughter Mary, at his wife. But neither his perception of the comic, his brilliant wit, his sarcastic humor, nor his self-knowledge saves him from the fate every man deserves who neglects his family and their fortunes, and whose ruling passion is to be let alone.

Did Macaulay exaggerate when he said that Miss Austen stood second to Shakespeare in ability to draw character in dialogue? Perhaps. But suppose he had meant ability to make people give themselves away most precisely in the fewest words? To draw their own portraits quickly and unconsciously? There would have been no exaggeration. No novelist has combined a power of inventing so many different forms of ultra-characteristic speech with a power of keeping each of these forms true to itself and natural all the time. Henry James has said that Miss Austen, "with all her light felicity, leaves us hardly more curious of her process, or of the experience in her that fed it, than the brown thrush who tells his story from the garden bough." This incuriosity is to be understood only by remembering how greatly James underestimated the importance of keeping his own men and women from talking all too much in the same way. Nothing in Jane Austen provokes curiosity so keenly as the process by which she achieved, working in so restricted a world, such sharply different naturalnesses in human speech. No reference to "the magic hand of chance" can explain her felicitous certainty.

But every one agrees with Henry James in being incurious of that experience in Miss Austen which fed her process. Her experience is written in her novels. Is the incompleteness of her experience recorded there? Her disparagers complain that there is no passion in those quiet and adroitly malicious pages, no interest in the Napoleonic wars she lived through, no wonder at life or death or love. It is all true, but those who complain of such omissions will always seem, to Miss Austen's ever-diverted readers, like the lady who wished Vermeer had painted battle scenes and Descents from the Cross.

Q. K.

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The Future of Pacifism

THERE is no paradox in the fact that the American people is profoundly pacifist and yet highly impatient of the present activities of many professed or professional pacifists. The disposition to call the latter pro-German and to move for their suppression is an easy way of expressing a sense of the untimely character of their moves at the present juncture. But the war will pass, and the future of the profound American desire for peace, for amity, for unhampered and prosperous intercourse, is a topic which is intimately connected with the war itself. For upon its constant consideration depends whether the impulse to a better ordered world which reconciled America to war shall find satisfaction or meet frustration. And I know no better way to introduce the subject than a consideration of the failure of the pacifist propaganda to determine finally the course of a nation which was converted to pacifism in advance.

The explanation, I take it, is that it takes two to make peace as well as to make war; or, as the present situation abundantly testifies, a much larger number than two. He was a poor judge of politics who did not know from the very day of the Lusitania message—or at all events from that of the Sussex message—that the entrance of the United States into the war depended upon the action of Germany. Any other notion was totally inconsistent with any belief in President Wilson's sincerity; it imputed to him an almost inconceivable levity in a time when seriousness was the chief need. Those who voted for him for President on the ground that he "kept us out of war" and who felt aggrieved when we got into war have only themselves to blame. He had unmistakably plotted a line which led inevitably to conflict with Germany in case the latter should take the course which she finally adopted.

This indictment of professional pacifism for futile gesturing may seem to rest upon acceptance of the belief in the political omnipotence of the executive; it may seem to imply the belief that his original step committed the nation irretrievably. Such an inference, however, is merely formal. It overlooks the material fact that President Wilson's action had the sanction of the country. I will not enter into the question of legal neutrality, but morally neutral the country never was, and probably the only stupid thing President Wilson did was to suppose, in his early proclamation, that it could be. And this brings us back to the basic fact that in a world organized for war there are as yet no political mechanisms which enable a nation with warm sympathies to make them effective, save through military participation. It is again, an instinctive perception of this fact which encourages the idea that pacifists who do not support the war must be pro-German at heart.

The best statement which I have seen made of the pacifist position since we entered the war is that of Miss Addams. She earnestly protests against the idea that the pacifist position was negative or laissez-faire. She holds that the popular impression that pacifism meant abstinence and just keeping out of trouble is wrong; that it stood for a positive international polity in which this country should be the leader of the nations of the world "into a wider life of coördinated activity"; she insists that the growth of nations under modern conditions involves of necessity international complications which admit "of adequate treatment only through an international agency not yet created." In short, the pacifists "urge upon the United States not indifference to moral issues and to the fate of liberty and democracy, but a strenuous endeavor to lead all nations of the earth into an organized international life."

That intelligent pacifism stands for this end, and that the more intelligent among the pacifists, like Miss Addams, saw the situation in this fashion need not be doubted. But as Miss Addams recognized in the same address there are many types of pacifists. I question whether any one who followed the pacifist literature which appeared in the year or two before we got into the war derived from it the conception that the dominant ideal was that ascribed to pacifism by Miss Addams, namely, that the United States should play a "vitally energetic rôle" in a political reorganization of the world. But even if this had been the universal idea of what was theoretically desirable, the force of circumstances forbade pacifists who drew back at war as a means of bringing about this rôle from pressing it.

The pacifist literature of the months preceding our entrance into war was opportunistic—breathlessly, frantically so. It did not deal in the higher strategy of international politics, but in immediate day-by-day tactics for staving off the war. Because the professional pacifists were committed to the idea that anything was better than our getting into the war, their interest in general international reorganization had no chance for expression. They were in the dilemma of trying to accomplish what only definite political agencies could effect, while

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admitting these agencies had not been created. Thus they were pushed out of the generic position of work for the development of such agencies into the very elementary attitude that if no nation ever allowed itself to be drawn into war, no matter how great the provocation, wars would cease to be. Hence the continuous recourse to concessions and schemes, devised *ad hoc* over night, to meet each changing aspect of the diplomatic situation so as to ward off war. The logic seems sound. But the method is one of treating symptoms and ignoring the disease. At the best, such a method is likely to remain some distance behind newly appearing symptoms, and in a critical disease the time is bound to come (as events demonstrated in our case) when the disease gets so identified with the symptoms that nothing can be done. All this seems to concern the past of pacifism rather than its future. But it indicates, by elimination, what that future must be if it is to be a prosperous one. It lies in furthering whatever will bring into existence those new agencies of international control whose absence has made the efforts of pacifists idle gestures in the air. Its more immediate future lies in seeing to it that the war itself is turned to account as a means for bringing these agencies into being. To go on protesting against war in general and this war in particular, to direct effort to stopping the war rather than to determining the terms upon which it shall be stopped, is to repeat the earlier tactics after their ineffectualness has been revealed. Failure to recognize the immense impetus to reorganization afforded by this war; failure to recognize the closeness and extent of true international combinations which it necessitates, is a stupidity equaled only by the militarist's conception of war as a noble blessing in disguise.

I have little patience with those who are so anxious to save their influence for some important crisis that they never risk its use in any present emergency. But I can but feel that the pacifists wasted rather than invested their potentialities when they turned so vigorously to opposing entrance into a war which was already all but universal, instead of using their energies to form, at a plastic juncture, the conditions and objects of our entrance. How far this wasted power is recoverable it is hard to say. Certainly an added responsibility is put upon those who still think of themselves as fundamentally pacifists in spite of the fact that they believed our entrance into the war a needed thing. For the only way in which they can justify their position is by using their force to help make the war, so far as this country can influence its final outcome, a factor in realizing the ideals which President Wilson expressed for the American people before and just upon entering the war. All such pacifists—and they comprise in my opinion the great mass of the American people—must see to it that these ideals are forced upon our allies, however unwilling they may be, rather than covered up by the débris of war. If the genuine pacifism of our country, a pacifism interested in permanent results rather than in momentary methods, had had leadership, it is not likely that we should have entered without obtaining in advance some stipulations. As it is, we (so far, at least, as any one knows) romantically abstained from any bargaining and thereby made our future task more difficult.

Not that the difficulty is all abroad. We have plenty of Bourbons and Bureaucrats in international diplomacy at home, and war undoubtedly strengthens their position by making them appear the genuine representatives of our war motives and policies. Their attitude is well expressed in the fact that since their imagination is confined to the flat map, their intellectual preparation for the post-bellum scene consists in redrawing the future map of Europe and the world—a form of indoor sport which even the literary men of England have now well nigh abandoned. Thus the present task of the constructive pacifist is to call attention away from the catchwords which so easily in wartime become the substitute for both facts and ideas back to realities. In view, for example, of the unjustified invasion of Serbia and Belgium, the rights of small nationalities tend to become an end in itself, a means to which is the "crushing" of Germany. The principle of nationality on its cultural side must indeed receive ample satisfaction in the terms of war settlement unless fuel for future conflagrations is to be stored up. But to get no further than setting up more small isolated nationalities on the map is almost wilfully to provoke future wars. If the day for isolated national sovereignty in the case of large nations has been rendered an anachronism by the new industry and commerce, much more is that the case for small political units. The case of Ireland, the clutter of nationalities in southeastern Europe, the fact that all the smaller neutral nations are now leading a distressed existence as appanages of the warring Powers, show how much more important questions of food supply, of coal and iron, of lines of railway and ship-transportation are for the making and ordering of states than the principle of isolated nationality, big or small. Germany was realistically inclined in its belief that the day of the small nation—in its traditional sense—had passed. Its tragic error lay in that egotism which forbade its seeing that the day of the big isolated nation had also passed.

So one might, I think, go over, one by one, the phrases which are now urged to the front as defin-

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ing the objects of war at the terms of peace and show that the interests of pacifism are bound up with securing the organs by which economic energies shall be articulated. We have an inherited political system which sits like a straitjacket on them since they came into being after the political system took on shape. These forces cannot be suppressed. They are the moving, the controlling, forces of the modern world. The question of peace or war is whether they are to continue to work furtively, blindly, and by those tricks of manipulation which have constituted the game of international diplomacy, or whether they are to be frankly recognized and the political system accommodated to them. The war does not guarantee the latter result. It gives an immense opportunity for it, an opportunity which justifies the risk. Military men continue to think within the lines laid down in the seventeenth century, in the days when modern "sovereign" nations were formed. Statesmen, guided by historians and that political science which has elevated the historic facts of temporary formations into an abstract and absolute science, work on the same model. As a result, too many influential personages are pure romanticists. They are expressing ideals which no longer have anything to do with the facts. This stereotyped political romanticism gives the pacifists their chance for revenge. Their idealism has but to undergo a course in the severe realism of those economic forces which are actually shaping the associations and organizations of men, and the future is with them.

JOHN DEWEY.

Trivia

The Busy Bees

SITTING for hours idle in the shade of the apple tree, near the garden-hives, and under the aërial thoroughfares of those honey-merchants, sometimes when the noonday heat was loud with their minute industry, or when they fell in crowds out of the late sun to their night-long labors, I have sought instruction from the Bees, and tried to appropriate to myself the old industrious lesson.

And yet, hang it all, who by rights should be the teachers and who the learners? For those peevish, over-toiled, utilitarian insects, was there no lesson to be derived from the spectacle of me? Gazing out at me with their myriad eyes from their joyless factories, might they not learn at last —might I not finally teach them—a wiser and more generous-hearted way to improve the shining hours?

L. PEARSALL SMITH.

CORRESPONDENCE

Defends Italian Aims

SIR: I trust that only accidental misinformation caused the misstatements regarding the conditions of Italia Irredenta and the position of Italy in the Allied war in your leading editorial of June 23rd.

To begin with, Italy has not been swayed by imperialistic or economic conditions when she entered the war, with a full knowledge and consciousness of the issues thereby entailed, and the hardships of it. Wholesale and irresponsible imperialism doesn't "dominate" Italy, and her King is such not only by the grace of God, but "by the will of the nation."

The writer who calls attention to the fact that Trieste has been under Hapsburg rule since 1382 betrays a rather incomplete historical training: the act of 1382, by which the "respublica Tergestina" submits to the high protectorate of Austrian Archduke, is practically a commercial transaction, an arrangement for peace in the interests of trade. But it must not be forgotten that when, in 1523, this free Latin Commune is requested to use officially the German language, it answers thus: "Cum Latini simus, linguam ignoramus teutonicam," and repeats further on: "quia civitas tergestina est in finibus et in limitibus Italiae, omnes cives habent proprium sermonem et idioma italicum."

In 1719 Trieste was "porto franco," the same as Genoa, Venice and Leghorn; and the interchange of mariners and tradesmen never was that of a great Austrian seaport, but that of a great Italian city. That Austria happens to find her most convenient port in a foreign land is not extraordinary, when one considers that Switzerland is commercially Genoa's hinterland, nor would this be a sufficient reason for requesting sovereignty of it. The contention that, because Trieste now belongs to Austria it must not be taken from her, and her Italian population must consequently be submitted to whatever outrage and oppression it may please Austria to heap upon her—and it does please Austria to heap it ruthlessly—is rather hazardous, to say the least. Ownership as a result of violence and an occasion for outrage is at least open to discussion; and the fact that the American colonies were in British possession did not prevent the Liberty Bell from sounding when the time for the great crisis came.

That there is no economic connection between Trieste and Italy is a fallacy which needs but a little geographical and commercial knowledge to explode. Austria drained the Mediterranean trade through the Adriatic into Trieste while she still held Venice; nor can Venice ever, or Brindisi, or Ancona, for the matter of that, compete with Trieste as a seaport, the infelicity of the western Adriatic coast for purposes both of modern trade and modern warfare being well known to all experts. But the attribution of economic motives or claims to Italy in the question of Trieste, Istria and Dalmatia is a side issue, if at all; Italy's motive for the war lies not in that; Italy fights for her hearths and homes under foreign stress and oppression; for her racial and ancestral seats, which no strange violence can ever wrench from her national heart and soul; for the monuments and records of her religion, her history and her civilization. The pride of Trieste, Fiume, Zara and their sister cities, in their Latin race and character is not "a memory of the Roman Empire," but the poignant truth and the vital issue of centuries, upheld in a long struggle, which has come just now to its ultimate, inevitable crisis.

When it comes to comparisons, Italy's Istria and Dal-

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matia vs. Germany's Alsace and Lorraine, as put by the writer, is an inversion nothing short of historical monstrosity. Istria and Dalmatia are exactly the same thing to Italy that Alsace-Lorraine is to France, and it is Austria which stands since 1866 in the same relation to these Italian provinces that Germany has imposed since 1870 upon Alsace-Lorraine. Austria has taken those thoroughly Venetian and Italian regions, has filled them with a state immigration of alien inland Slavs, has systematically persecuted and suppressed the Italian natives in them, and now would hold them forth as a righteous Slavic heritage; infer, in fact, that Italy claims that which is not hers. Now, it ought to be made very clear that Italy does emphatically not claim Croatia, or anybody else's land or sea, that she does not begrudge outlets on the Adriatic to reasonable neighbors, that she does not want to oust any Slav from his home where the Slav has not ousted Italians from theirs; and the proof of it is that it was the navy of Italy, and of Italy alone, who transported to safe havens across the Adriatic the valiant remains of that Serbian army which, duly refreshed and reorganized, will ultimately make possible the restoration of a greater Serbia and the eventual bringing together of the Southern Slavs.

But Croatia's natural geographical and political metropolis is Agram, or Zagreb that one may wish to call it, certainly not Fiume or Pola, whose very names bear witness to their Italian character.

As for Dalmatia, the character of the land has always been dominantly and significantly Italian. The "purely Slavic" lands lie back of the Dinaric Alps, nor does Italy concern herself with these; but with the Austrian state policy of denaturalization and denationalization of the Adriatic seacoast. Against this, what your writer is pleased to call the "prosperous Italian minority" has been protesting for years with word and pen, votes and lives. And the assumption that "it is not likely to cause much trouble now" is adding insult to injury. Neither does, to the best of human knowledge, the dying gasp of the murdered man "cause much trouble" in the circle of the murderer's friends, or to the cynic the heaving sigh of a soul in despair. But crimes that have been committed call for redress in a world of men.

AMY A. BERNARDY.

New York City.

[NOTE: The argument of our correspondent seems to center about three main contentions: first, that Trieste and other east-Adriatic ports are largely Italian in race and language; second, that Austria encouraged Slavic immigration into these cities in order to dispute Italy's claim; third, that the west-Adriatic cities cannot compete with Trieste as a seaport. The first point we admitted in our editorial, but we stated the additional fact that it would not be practicable to separate these coast cities from their Slavic hinterland. We fail to see that any light has been thrown on this difficulty. The danger is so real that Austria has been enabled to use a Croatian Slav as the commanding general of her armies against Italy. Whatever the settlement, there will necessarily be racial minorities whose rights must be guaranteed. The second contention is, from the American angle, a quibble, since the basis for future peace is found not in historical rights, but in the actual character of the existing populations and economic conditions. It would be possible also to show that even historically the Slavs have a better right to the coast than the Italians—who once were immigrants. The third contention merely bears out our position on the economic situation—Trieste is naturally a great port since it connects the Adriatic and Mediterranean sea traffic with southeastern Europe. The principal uses Italy could make of it would be either to stifle this trade in favor of her own, or to levy tribute on Austro-Hungarian trade at the only gate where it can make connection with the sea. Italy's own trade now has sufficient outlet elsewhere. As for Dalmatia, the Serbs disagree violently with the Italian annexationists. Authoritative observers who know the country bear testimony that neither in language, race nor culture is it Italian.

No one can deny that for a long time there has been a strong imperialist movement in Italy, which outmatches for ambition even that of the Pan-Germans. Has our correspondent forgotten d'Annunzio's ego-maniac rhapsodies? —THE EDITORS.]

As to Prohibition

SIR: I was interested in your editorial on prohibition and the action of the President in, to use Senator Vardaman's expression, torpedoing the good ship Prohibition.

You say it had no place on a food bill. True! But we want to be just. Whose fault was it that prohibition was a rider on the food bill? The West and much of the South wanted the efficiency in war that they have found prohibition tends to make in their own dry territory.

Knowing this, the southern and western Democrats put prohibition in their program at the beginning of this session. But we read in the Searchlight that the New York and Massachusetts Democrats made them rescind the vote and promise that they would not vote for a prohibition measure unless the President recommended it.

So the dry Democrats had to vote for prohibition, if at all, as a rider on some other bill. Hence it was tacked on to the food bill.

You may say: But why, when it could not be a straight-out bill, didn't the drys give up trying for prohibition? The Springfield Republican answered that when it said that the western congressmen would rather face a prairie cyclone than go home without prohibition in their hands.

They could not just abandon the whole thing, because the liquor-ridden Democrats of Massachusetts and New York had played a deft trick on them at their initial caucus. They were there to put prohibition across, just as men like Lodge, Wadsworth and Penrose were there to keep "business as usual" and not allow loans, saloon property, etc., to be disturbed. One represented a dry world, the other a wet business world.

If the President had come to these drys and, in black and white, said that if they would not put a prohibition amendment on the food bill he would later recommend prohibition, thus nullifying the caucus action, then they might have dared to let up on the fight.

I don't blame the President. I blame the East. They have been so lax about this great race-hygiene movement that when the call for it came they were not educated enough in the costs of alcohol to act.

The speech made by Senator Henry Cabot Lodge in the Senate was probably the farthest from accurate knowledge of any speech ever made in the United States Senate.

The West will feel very bitterly towards the East, but it really is a case of "God forgive them, they know not what they do."

E. TILTON.

East Gloucester, Massachusetts.

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At the Capitol

Uniting Congress with the Government

NO matter what action is taken in conference upon the amended food-control bill, there will remain many members of Congress dissatisfied with what has been done to regulate the prices which the government will pay for its war material. As the Advisory Commission of the Council of National Defense has broadened its interests and run its subcommittees up into hundreds, there has been a growing uneasiness lest members of the Commission, acting as both buyers and sellers, should not infrequently buy from themselves. This concern on the part of Congress has now and then set the administrative and legislative branches at cross purposes; but its most harmful result is the way in which it has given anti-war spirit a strong peg on which to hang. Good use has been made of the situation. Senator Vardaman spoke this week of "the patriotic gentlemen who are taking advantage of the most extraordinary emergency in the history of the nation to rob and plunder the people. These patriots were much in evidence during the year just passed. . . . This war is largely of their making."

The danger in this sort of statement, no doubt given wide circulation, is that to many people it will seem to give semi-official corroboration to their own unexpressed fears. They will see a joker in the amendment which Mr. Pomerene succeeded in having attached to the food-control bill, prohibiting a member of the Advisory Commission from recommending contracts to the Council "without making a full disclosure in writing of what interest he may have in such contract." Nor will those who are able to doubt the integrity of the present system find assurance in the amendment which creates a joint congressional committee "to safeguard the expenditure of war appropriations." What is needed is not so much the presence of checks as the provision of some means of coöperation at the source.

On another page of this issue Mr. William Hard proposes as a solution of the administrative difficulties already in evidence that questions of policy be left to a national council, free to place the responsibility for action upon a unified Board which has room for all the major executive agencies. Everything which has been done, so far, in the way of securing closer union between Congress and the administration has tended to tie Congress to the administrative agencies with which it has no reasonable concern, and to separate it from the Council with whose choice of policy it has every reason to be familiar. If it is determined, for instance, that the government will make its purchases in a certain industry on terms more favorable than a bare cost-plus basis, then the excess profits taxes which Congress levies must select that industry for special provision. A scheme of war organization will waste opportunities unless it extends beyond the administrative agencies to Congress, in a way that will minimize the clash of separate policies.

The suggestion for providing this sort of closer union which has been most widely advertised is Senator Weeks's proposal of a joint committee on the conduct of the war. This is not the proposal which was put into the food-control bill, as an amendment, but a more ambitious one, delegating five members from each house as a group continually in session "to confer and advise with the President" upon problems growing out of the war. The suggestion recognizes an apparent need; but Mr. Weeks provides no more secure method of choosing these chief representatives of Congress than to leave their selection in the hands of the respective committees which at present parcel out membership in the standing committees of the two houses. Any other method of selection, no doubt, would fail because of the friction it created between the old and the new orders. But the result is that Mr. Weeks provides not so much a new method of pooling responsibilities as a chiefly formal recognition of the more important committee leaders—Mr. Stone, Mr. Lodge, Mr. Simmons, Mr. Penrose and probably Mr. Martin, in the Senate; Mr. Kitchin, Mr. Mann, Mr. Flood, Mr. Cooper and probably Mr. Fitzgerald, in the House. None of these men could more effectively advance his widely known and more or less individual ideas of what the war is being fought about than he can in his present position. There would simply be instituted a prowling committee of congressmen burdened with the responsibility of finding something special to be exercised about.

It would be possible to avoid this setting up of an aimless supervisive agency, and still utilize a part of Mr. Weeks's plan, by cutting the number of congressmen from ten to five, or three—and placing them in a position to take part in the deliberations of the Council itself. But though theoretically there would in this way be provided a simultaneous initiation of war plans by both branches of the government, the scheme would be likely to fail because it covered a too narrow field. The business of Congress is so divided between committees that in placing few enough congressmen in direct touch with the Council to prevent that body from becoming unwieldy, there would be neglected many committee leaders whose coöperation was indispensable. A surer guaranty of union would be supplied by permitting members of the Council to appear on the floors of Congress to explain, support and, if advisable, to modify their policy. Apparently, however, traditional opposition to this innovation is keen enough to prevent its present adoption, and some early improvement is needed, even if it be of a less effective sort.

In default of the more natural plan, why should there not be instituted a regular weekly report from the Council to Congress, publishing conclusions, and advising means or putting them at once into action? Such a report would fix responsibility more publicly than it is fixed in the present necessity of sending agents of the Council to Congress as lobbyists. It would, of course, fail in its purpose unless it were made enough of an event to have publicity center upon it. For Congress it would have to be an occasion regularly anticipated, at certain intervals, as an opportunity for criticism; for the newspapers it would need to be sufficiently interesting to deserve playing up.

Such a plan would still leave a gap between decision and action. But if it failed to inspire a complete coöperation, it would also fail to produce the embarrassments that would arise in the creation of an unoccupied joint committee, or in the elevation to the Council of a few congressmen with limited powers of initiating legislation. It would in fact tend to lead directly to the participation of administrative heads in congressional action. For the desirability of having immediate answers to the questions raised in such a report would before long make obvious the folly of not inviting Council members to be present in person to supply them. Nor should this almost inevitable after-effect of the plan be permitted to argue against its adoption. The presence of administrative leaders upon the floor would strengthen and not weaken the hand of Congress. For the war has demonstrated that in the choosing of a policy and the initiation of action Congress can be no farther out of the picture than it is at present. C. M.

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Nietzsche's Religion

The Will to Freedom, by J. N. Figgis. New York: Charles Scribners' Sons. $1.25.

OF living English writers on political theory Dr. Figgis is unquestionably the first; and two at least of his volumes are beginning to exert no insignificant influence in the shaping of the English state. But Dr. Figgis is also a curious example of dual personality. At the same time that he expounds political ideas with deep learning and high distinction, he is an important member of that party in the Church of England which is at once notable for the liberalism of its social opinions and the uncompromising narrowness of its theological dogmas. This volume is an interesting fusion of his two personalities. Again and again the political theorist struggles for expression, only to be promptly and mercilessly annihilated by his clerical colleague. What Dr. Figgis has attempted is a discussion of Nietzsche's philosophy in the light of Christian ethics. As might be expected, he has written a curiously uneven book. As a whole it is not successful in its ultimate purpose; the exposition of Nietzsche, in whom Dr. Figgis does not believe, is so much better than his exposition of Christianity, in which he does, that while one sees very clearly exactly how he interprets Nietzsche's own doctrine, one is far less confident as to the manner in which he would meet it. Where the volume is really valuable is in its sympathetic account of Nietzsche's life, the multitude of things by the way that are wisely conceived and admirably said, and the whole of the admirable fifth lecture on the charm of his philosophy. But one cannot help feeling that we should have profited greatly if the time spent on this book had been devoted by Dr. Figgis to that volume on Bossuet for which all students of political theory are so anxiously looking.

Dr. Figgis begins admirably by emphasizing the important fact that Nietzsche is to be taken seriously. That is worth saying because there are far too many stupid people (and some wise ones who should know better) who either will not read his works because he died insane, or on the ground—a London bookseller actually uses the hypothesis on his catalogues—that he is responsible for the European war. As to his madness, one can only adopt the wise epigram of Chatham in reply to criticism of General Wolfe and say that he had better, for our sakes, bite some other philosophers. His connection with the European war is about as direct as Calvin's with the form of American federalism. He could not have known that retired cavalry officers like General Bernhardi would solace their declining years with the reading of his philosophic epics; certainly he would have been the first to appreciate the irresistible humor of so Gilbertian a situation. The simple fact of the matter is that thought is by its very nature explosive, and no one can set limits to the result of a powerful idea. One doubts very gravely whether Herr Ballin is any more acquainted with Nietzsche's philosophy than Mr. Rockefeller, Frau Bertha Krupp or the late Mrs. Green; and in German universities he has not yet displaced Kant and Fichte and Hegel. It is probably true that all over Germany you can find half-baked ideologues to whom his works have brought the same comfort that the Bible has brought to earnest Christians. But the equally important fact that an eighteen-volume edition of his works has sold largely in this country is very relevant to that issue. The important thing to realize is that Nietzsche had a very fundamental criticism to make of the whole structure of modern civilization.

Dr. Figgis is right when he urges that Nietzsche is less a philosopher than the protagonist of a new religion. Indeed, to describe his doctrine as immorality touched by emotion is no inapt exposition of its purpose. What, in sum, he makes is a protest against the Christian practice of translating values into terms of another life to be lived in a heaven for which he has the profoundest abhorrence. The real life is terrestrial, and our business is to find a scale of values adequate to its possible richness. And here he was immensely struck by the rightness of a classification of men into sheep and shepherd. Whenever he examined, whatever he analyzed, the distinction between master and slave struck him as fundamental. He was impressed by the fact that the result of social existence is to mitigate the harshness of that reality. Not merely do the meek eventually inherit the earth; they have actually entered into full possession of it. He was profoundly convinced that a social organization of which such could be the final result must be mistaken in its foundations. Those who had access to the riches of life were incapable of appreciating them. The one thing fundamental to right living was for those who can by nature fully experience its meaning to have access to that experience. He did not shrink from admitting that the practice of his doctrine would revolutionize our normal habits of thought. He never denied that many of the qualities we now call virtuous must, in such an analysis, be the veritable quintessence of evil. That was why, to take a characteristic example, he always professed the belief that the conquest of pity is noble. That was why he found a sense of joy in isolation, a sense of victory in persecution, in hate or in vilification. For they were the index to progress in the attainment of the ideal, the abandonment of what he contemptuously dismissed as the bagman's paradise of those who, like Cobden and Spencer, would hamper the world in the swaddling-clothes of commercial ecstasy. Let it be remembered that against the worship of militarism and commercial prosperity he firmly set his face. It was the passion of the mind that, after all, most greatly entranced him; and he insisted on the value of hardship as a training in moral fibre. He simply insisted that when we take life as it is the one dominating fact that distinguishes it is a will for power. "This universe," he said, "is a monster of energy," and he defined goodness in terms of its appropriation by those who were best fitted to use it. Of course, in such an attitude the distinction we usually make between right and wrong is simply without meaning. What we will must be right; for it becomes thereby the expression of the purpose of the universe. He dismisses the idea of world-unity; each of us is too isolated and the problem is to force ourselves to complete realization without regard to the difficulties in the way. Caesar Borgia attempted that as did Napoleon; but the crowd in the end proved too strong for them. But that in no way detracts from the fact that the object of life is to provide such men with a field within which their will may adequately exercise.

Dr. Figgis has pointed out the obvious dangers of such an attitude. Its passion for limitless individualism is, in practical life, simply an invitation to oppressive conduct. "Every little poetaster," as Dr. Figgis says, "may fancy himself one of the elect"; and those who are acquainted with the disciples of his teaching will appreciate its truth. His call for experience is interpreted as an incentive to license. The intellectual purity of Nietzsche becomes the delicately unbridled lust of D'Annunzio. And Dr. Figgis is profoundly right when he insists that the consequence of the doctrine is to postulate an infallibility greater even

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than the Vatican Council dared to define. "The question as to who is the superman," he writes, " . . . is a question of fact." Who shall announce his arrival? Nobody knows him except himself and we shall be chary of believing him. It can hardly be Mr. Rockefeller who is, I believe, an earnest Baptist, or Mr. Sunday, who is perfectly catholic in his desire for universal salvation. Are we to vote upon it? That would probably result in the election of Ty Cobb, Mary Pickford, and Mr. Harold Bell Wright. But if any of them passed into the realms of the superman their mandate would doubtless be withdrawn. *Si monumentum quaeris, circumspice,* is an admirable canon of judgment for aspiring candidates to these lofty circles.

The simple fact is that in the conflict between society and the individual it is usually the individual who suffers. "The first great act of faith," a distinguished jurist has said—though his dictum will not be found in the Reports—" is to believe that you are not God." But so to take on trust the conditions of the universe is to deny Nietzsche's solution of life. To the gospel of power we oppose, as Dr. Figgis finely says, the gospel of freedom. To the egoism and the tyranny of the one we oppose the charity and the tolerance of the other. We reject its imperial politics whether it is personified in the emperor at Byzantium or the emperor at Berlin. It may be a pathetic weakness thus to limit our experience; but it will probably be found on examination that it is a weakness which brings its own reward.

H. J. L.

Swinburne

Life of Algernon Charles Swinburne, by Edmund Gosse. New York: The Macmillan Co. $3.50.

PERHAPS *nous* must always be a little dissatisfied with matter, idea with phenomena, as with things not of the first importance. This may be the law. And friends of the mind-idea who believe they have some special insight and knowledge, are perhaps also subject to it, and so bound to be dissatisfied no matter who presents phenomena to them. If so, it will be no slight upon author or work to cite Mr. Gosse's Life of Algernon Charles Swinburne, as arousing just this sort of dissatisfaction. Swinburne's genius was singularly literary: to an unusual degree letters were his life, living a by-product. He was as much pure "mind" as is possible, as nearly immaterial in body. And those who have formed an opinion of him through the medium of his realest activity are likely to be dissatisfied with any but an inspired account of his external life. Mr. Gosse's Life is not inspired. He loved the man, if at all, something this side of idolatry; and his imaginative sympathy, from which also inspiration might derive, is not great in comparison with his dominating desire to be scientific in his collection and presentation of facts.

Yet, when all is said, the Swinburnians have much to be thankful for, little to complain of, beyond what was inevitable, in this work, especially if account be made of the difficulties that beset the biographer. It is conversant with all the details of Swinburne's life, stored with all sorts of lively, intimate information concerning him, his work, his familiars, and with a literary criticism whose classic authority for praise and dispraise, in most instances at least, it would be hard to match among all that has been written about him. It presents this judiciously, as was essential, Swinburne being but seven years dead, in advance of some who knew him, whose susceptibilities might still be hurt by too much plain speaking; and this quality persists even though here and there decorum is maintained a bit too obviously, the muse of history being called upon to draw the veil over incidents which are quite as unsatisfactory thus veiled as they could well be frankly described. It presents it, too, with special completeness as regards certain not quite desirable traits or habits of the man, his excitable, rachitic temper, his impetuosity, febrility, elvishness, errancy, the flapping of his hands and the imperfect poise of his feet. And yet the picture given seldom approaches caricature. An equal eye to happier traits somehow saves it. Could the eye have been a bit more partial to some of these; could Swinburne's hero-worship, for instance, have had as much more attention than his "racketing" in London, as it deserves, the picture would have been estimable.

The balance, unfortunately, is sometimes struck in the other direction. Mr. Gosse emphasizes the eccentricities of his subject. Swinburne is made out to be even odder than perhaps he was. He is an "extraordinary" creature—his mind "strange and erratic." He is "successfully modelled in a mould unlike most and perhaps all of his fellow creatures." "His physical strangeness exceeded, perhaps, that of any other entirely sane man of imaginative genius whose characteristics have been preserved for us." And though his charming amiability and almost child-like sweetness toward those of whose fidelity he was certain, comes in for remark, or the exquisiteness "when he chose" of his manners or "the flashing concentration of his level look," the two orders are never brought under the government of good portraiture. Yet it should and could be so. For even though Mr. Gosse does not greatly assist his readers in forgetting the eccentricities, he records that he himself did, on occasion, forget them.

One is forced, therefore, to conclude that it is the nature of the biographer to have seen these things—just as it was in the nature of Lord St. Aldwyn to see in him, at Eton, nothing but "a horrid little boy"; or of Ruskin to find him "extremely exhilarating," or of Mr. George Moore to find him in his "naked bed," and to add this to the explanation already made, that Mr. Gosse has deliberately chosen to play the part of scientific observer, unswayed by emotion or artistic design. Fortunately he is artist enough to quote on some important occasions from more sympathetic persons than himself, making use, a little cautiously, of accounts of Algernon's behavior, in boyhood, for example, which have reached us "through the memories of those who regarded him with love and admiration."

Most utilized of these latter is Swinburne's cousin, Lord Redesdale. He is no hero-worshipper; but his account is colored by the most engaging affection for the elf whom he companioned at school, on walks through Windsor forest, Algernon moving along "with that peculiar dancing step of his, his eyes gleaming with enthusiasm," and pouring out "in his unforgettable voice, the latest literary treasures he had acquired. This was at Eton. At Oxford, unfortunately, Mr. Gosse finds for Swinburne no chronicler quite so kindly. There are people enough who recollect him dancing round the table, screaming abuse, and advocating the assassination of Napoleon III; or in the midst of one of his liturgical reverences before the portrait of his revered master, Mazzini; or in full enjoyment of his rare gift of vituperative eloquence. But none are quoted who record much of his gentler and more winsome moods, of which Mr. Disney Leith has given so agreeable a record. But the picture is impressive none

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the less. Mr. Gosse evidently felt some of the glamour of his subject, and in the days subsequent to the culmination of Swinburne's university career in "total and scandalous failure," and his fiery advent upon the world with Atalanta in Calydon, and Poems and Ballads, Swinburne is his Childe Roland, blowing a clarion horn before the castle of Mrs. Grundy. He is a champion against Philistia, "a brilliant being, a scarlet and azure macaw among the birds of the forest," and "the wonder, the delight and sometimes the terror" of that generation. "His passionate appeal for a reasonable and manly liberty of utterance . . . struck a new note, or revived a forgotten note, of wholesome freedom."

There will be little dissent from Mr. Gosse's evaluation of the social significance of Swinburne's activity during this period, though there may be some surprise at the warmth of support and encouragement Swinburne received from his friends and receives from his biographer. The external facts given are equally acceptable. But one misses an intimate knowledge of Swinburne's mind. Mr. Gosse knows too much about his outer activity. He is also too disposed to treat Swinburne as a "wonderful child, depending, with great simplicity, on the affection of a narrow circle of friends who were far too strongly devoted to him to allow his irresponsible moods to worry them." He either overlooks or is ignorant of his inner development; perhaps the latter, for though for some reason, he extends the period of the composition of Poems and Ballads (1866), from seven years (Swinburne's measure), to eleven, he has practically no new light to throw upon the chronology of these poems, nor intimation that they may have had a more logical order of composition than of arrangement. He leaves the problem to be solved when more definite data are forthcoming—as it is possible they will be.

Ensuing upon this period comes that of Songs Before Sunrise, which Mr. Gosse considers Swinburne's cardinal and crowning work. Nowhere is his praise more felicitous and welcome. The poems are "rich in thought, sumptuous in language, and uplifted in tone." They "breathe so consistent a spirit of pure self-sacrifice and impassioned devotion that they amazed the admirers of Felice and Dolores; and the Prelude, which is cited as "one of the noblest exercises of reasoned imagination which exist in the English language," is quoted to explain the causes of the change. Two qualities in them, however, disturb the biographer—the apparent sourcelessness of the emotion of the poet, and the feeling that the Liberty before which he poured out his spirit in songs of unparalleled beauty, was largely a chimera. "It is difficult . . . to enter into the delirium of instant hope of such a poem as Mater Triumphalis, or The Litany of Nations." But these two qualities, being integral, *should* be explained. Mr. Gosse has the explanation in his hand, but somehow fails to make use of it. He is aware of the one-time sympathy between Meredith and Swinburne, but is so much inclined to emphasize the "remarkable incompatibility" which developed between them that he forgets there ever was such an epic of Italian liberty as Vittoria, and that Swinburne read it with passionate delight. He is aware that Swinburne was preëminently a hero-worshipper; that in describing "the idolatry with which he flung himself at the feet of Landor, in 1864, he wrote: 'I am not sure that any other emotion is so endurable and persistently delicious as that of worship, when your god is indubitable and incarnate before your eyes?'" He has before his eyes the three gods incarnate of Swinburne's worship, Landor, Mazzini and Hugo: the first of these a continuance into Swinburne's own life of the early nineteenth century love of Italy which Shelley had consecrated; the second, the life-long martyr to the cause of Italian liberty. And yet he can write before the consuming passion of Swinburne's address to Italy: "we are embarrassed by the knowledge that he had no relations and hardly any acquaintances in a country which he only visited twice, as a tourist, for a few weeks." "We are not accustomed in the history of literature to find a poet so passionately excited about problems of state craft which do not affect his own life in any way . . ."

As for the chimerical quality of Swinburne's dream of the Republic, one can do no better than to remark that not very long ago, upon the entrance of the United States into the world war, Mr. Asquith is quoted as having exclaimed: "The day has dawned!" Ten years ago when he was fighting the battle of British democracy against the veto power of the Lords, he could do no other than fortify himself with those exquisite stanzas of patient hope, beginning, "We pray not, we, to behold," from Tenebrae in this same collection of republican poems. Swinburne's dream may be nearer something like realization than we know. At least it has supporters not usually held to be visionaries.

These matters are indeed small in a large book. They indicate, however, a lack of insight or sympathy which is regrettable. The defect continues to the end, chiefly because the "middle years," 1870-1879, offer few external incidents directly illustrative of positive genius —mainly illustrative of its errancies; and because the cloistered and secluded years at Putney, under the guardianship of Watts-Dunton offer hardly any incidents at all, other than literary. Yet these last thirty years were happy. "All the charming part of Swinburne's character blossomed forth anew, his gallantry, his tenderness, his loyalty." Could the biographer have found place for more illustration of these moods his work would also be happier and more valuable. As it is he slights them, and seems almost a little envious that "the very gentle, punctilious old gentleman" who received people at the Pines, "in the unvarying presence of Watts-Dunton, was very far indeed from the brilliant being, the splendid high-flyer who had amazed an earlier generation." Undoubtedly the comment is true, but besides being a truism, it seems to derive from some feeling Mr. Gosse (and others) have against the man who was directly responsible for preserving this "brilliant being" alive at all, if without his brilliance. Watts-Dunton is not in good odor in this book, and unfortunately this circumstance, or some other undiscoverable, seems to affect the comment passed upon Swinburne's work of the period. Elsewhere so high, wise, judicious, it now becomes capricious, in particular as it approaches the poems on the sea, whose influence Watts-Dunton fostered. This may be pardoned in respect of Tristam of Lyonesse, if a critic be so over classic as to be untouched by its romantic beauty, and its mingling of the tragedy of the lovers with "starry vicissitudes"; though it does appear unnecessary to speak of them as "howling" to the accompaniment of winds and waves. But to dismiss By the North Sea as "but an imitation of the Epilogue of 1866" is undiscerning; as it is to complain of The Song for the Centenary of Landor that it is "foggy and fatiguing." These are "personal poems." Their importance is as much for the biographer as for the critic, and to overlook this importance is to cut one's self off from the most valuable biographical material of Swinburne's later life. The complete life of Swinburne, which must

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some day be written, will necessarily deal with them, and with all other work illustrative of the beauty of the later years: such as the prelude to Locrine (1887), dedicated to Alice Swinburne, with its exquisite expression of "love inarticulate," or the Altar of Righteousness (1904), with its final confession of faith. And in so doing it will but unite with Mr. Gosse's valuable account the spiritual significances, which once and again have escaped him. It will find difficulty, however, in improving upon the record of most of the matters Mr. Gosse describes. It is not in what he sees that he is at fault—it is in what he does not see; and the fact that in defect of keen insight his record is satisfying even in the second degree, is convincing proof of the value of his service. B. H.

Frustrated Nationalities

The Balkans: A History, by Nevill Forbes, Arnold Toynbee, D. Mitrany and D. G. Hogarth. Oxford: The Clarendon Press. $1.75.

MOST of the great wars of European history have involved the Balkans; many of them have originated there. In this unhappy region Asia has again and again tried conclusions with Europe, the barbaric North has tried conclusions with the civilized Mediterranean. The Balkans plunged the whole world into war in 1914, and it may be predicted with something like certainty that unless the Balkan problem soon receives a satisfactory solution, there are more wars to come. What is it that endows this tract of narrow plains and rugged hills with such ominous potentialities? In recent times it has been the presence of national groups, intensely self-conscious and tenacious of purpose, each frustrated in its aspirations toward unity and national development. The greater part of the Serbian race is subject to Austro-Hungarian oppression. The greater part of the lands inhabited by Rumanians lies under Hungarian or Russian dominion. Much territory prevailingly Bulgarian lies within Serbian and Rumanian boundaries, and a large fraction of the Greek race lives under the rule of Turkey, England, Italy, Bulgaria and Albania. There are still Turks scattered throughout the Balkans and tasting oppression such as their race formerly inflicted. It is no wonder that in all of these states politics is concerned chiefly with external affairs. The business of the Balkan statesman is so to play his cards as to increase the chance that his compatriots may be redeemed from foreign oppression. This involves seeking support from the rival great Powers, playing upon their jealousies. And the great Powers are in no position to repel such intrigues, since the Balkan states hold the high road from the Teutonic powers to the Levant, from Russia to the Mediterranean.

The Balkan problem can not be understood without a knowledge of Balkan history. And such a knowledge is hard for the layman to attain. All history of the Balkans is more or less propagandist. As the historian's sympathies run, so run the relative values he places upon the conflicting claims of Bulgars, Rumanians, Serbs, Greeks. Of the authors of The Balkans it may be said, however, that they are as little propagandist as it is in the nature of historians to be. They endeavor honestly to be just to each people. "That any one of them is arrayed against us to-day is not to be laid entirely or chiefly at its own door. They are all fine peoples who have not obtained their proper places in the sun." Nevertheless, it must be noted that Mr. Forbes ascribes to Bulgaria a somewhat larger share of the guilt of the Second Balkan War than impartial British historians were disposed to ascribe before the outbreak of the great war in 1914.

In the case of each of the Balkan states, the history offers an account reaching back to very early times. The Serbs and Croats made their appearance about 500 A. D. Ethnically and linguistically they are one people: what separates them to-day is the fact that the Serbs are Orthodox Greek, the Croats Roman Catholic, a consequence of the drawing of diocesan boundaries through the heart of the race when the Eastern Empire split off from the Western. This historical irrelevancy is all the moral argument the Austrians can urge against a united Serbian state. The Bulgarians appeared a century and a half later and merged with the Slavic population so completely as quite to lose their original language. They preserved a distinctive character, however.

Each Balkan people except the Rumanians has had its periods of imperial glory to lay the basis for extravagant territorial ambitions in the present day. The modern Greeks, although their country was once Slavicized to such an extent that a great part of the place names in Greece are Slavic, claim heirship to the Byzantine Empire, usurped by the Turks. It is interesting to note Mr. Hogarth's emphasis upon the fact that there was really no serious break in tradition when the Turks replaced the Greek emperors. The empire remained the same in organization, Byzantine, not Turkish. The Bulgarian Empire at its height in the tenth century extended over most of the Balkan peninsula, and the Serbian Empire

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of the fourteenth century was scarcely less extensive. Unlike Greek and Turkish imperialism, that of Bulgaria and Serbia had no institutional principle of cohesion. Bulgaria and Serbia were strong or weak according to the capacity of their individual rulers. One may venture the suggestion that this early incapacity of Bulgars and Serbs to establish imperial institutions and their present tenacious nationalism are different manifestations of the same social character. It is a character favorable to democratic cooperation, not to such permanent relations of superiority and inferiority as Levantine imperialism has always been based upon.

What with the competing traditions of Balkan hegemony, the unnatural state of existing boundaries and the confusing intermixture of nationalities in all parts of the Balkans, the outlook for a permanent adjustment of national claims looks dim. And even if the Balkan states could make up their minds to live together in peace, it is doubtful whether they would be permitted to do so. Each must remain too small to offer serious resistance to foreign intrigue. The only adequate solution, in the view of Mr. Mitrany, and presumably in that of the other authors, is federation. True, these peoples, for the most part, cordially detest one another. They will have to learn to sink their dislikes, as those of their nationals who have emigrated to America have done. United in a federation, the Balkan states would be immune against aggression, and powerful enough to dominate the roads from Germany to the Levant and from Russia to the Mediterranean. A Balkan federation could live in peace, and go far toward conferring peace upon the rest of the world.

A. J.

Upper Layers

Hatchways, by Ethel Sidgwick. Boston: Small, Maynard & Co. $1.40.

"'YOU want to look about you, eh?' said Sir George. 'And what section of English society do you want to see?'

"'Every section,' said M. du Frettay. 'But I like the upper layers best.'"

Through the eyes of that charming young Frenchman —always a sympathetic medium of nationality for Miss Sidgwick—the reader of Hatchways views the section of English society that Miss Sidgwick always likes best. The central figure in it was Ernestine, the mistress of Hatchways. Hatchways was pure England at its best—one thinks of it in May. In her simple, direct manner of loving, in her calm and her motherliness, Ernestine reminds one forcibly of Candida. The object of much of this motherliness was the younger brother of the duke, Iveagh, a rather homely young man, if one may believe the author, but one who possessed a very definite charm, potent even in his own unhappiness. Iveagh is of a type that Miss Sidgwick understands with a peculiar degree of sympathy, and in whose portrayal she seems to grow in understanding with the progress of her art. So is the Frenchman, though it is a question whether he is not given a touch of the too-theatrical. So, too, is Lise, with her pretty dominance and her way of addressing the world in general in her perfect poise. One loves to linger in that drawing-room of Ernestine's, with the blue dragon china in the foreground; with du Frettay, a smiling commentary, in the rear; with Iveagh somewhere about, being obstreperous; with that cotton-frocked "painting girl" Bess and her ubiquitous climbing kittens; with a group of Ernestine's noisy grown-up children prattling about stables or frocks or people with little inconsequence; and with Ernestine herself—who is Hatchways.

Miss Sidgwick's wit plays about them all so lightly, albeit so sincerely, she is so true to them, and to herself, and to her art, that her minor faults—an occasional incoherence in the usually pregnant ordering of her words, or a clumsy avoidance of the split infinitive after the mode Américaine—can detract little from her genuinely great achievement. In character-drawing, in dialogue, in that most difficult of all attainment, the lightness which is a sign of depth, she has more than once proved herself a master over her chosen field, an irresistible story-teller in her own world. Hatchways, if not a positive advance in Miss Sidgwick's work, is of itself an individual and charming production.

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to this issue

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DUNLOP

Lessons in Golf Ball Construction

No. 1

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(To be continued)

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